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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Development in Developing Countries 
Spencer, Saint-Simon, Comte, Weber, Durkheim and Parsons 
saw that the progress of societies, which implied development, 
is a result of a natural evolutionary process with discrete 
stages. Modernization theory, based on this 'natural 
evolutionary process', argues that underdevelopment of a 
society is a transitory stage. All societies, which are 
autonomous, are progressing along a linear path. The 
traditional backward social structure of less developed 
countries has no capacity to adopt modern institutional forms. 
Marx was not an exception to this thinking. He also believed 
that society progresses through definite sequential stages. 
He believed that capital accumulation in capitalist countries 
would have a negative effect on societal progress in the 
developing countries. Dependency theorists, extending the 
process of international capital accumulation, introduce the 
concepts of core and periphery in the world system to explain 
the continuing dependence and underdevelopment of developing 
countries. 
Wallerstein (1979) in his world system theory, argues 
that all these theories have reified parts of the totality 
into different unrealistic units and then compared those 
structures. Instead the totality of global structure has to 
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be examined. The totality is the world capitalist system 
which has a world scale division of labor. He argues that 
periphery countries have no possibility of development within 
this capitalist economy. 
However, the present uneven development in developing 
countries is not adequately explained by all of these 
theories. Wide-spread absolute poverty in developing 
countries, the diversity of economic and human development 
among the countries, the disparity between the level of 
economic development and the level of human development in a 
country and the complexity of development issues call for a 
more comprehensive and diverse theoretical analysis. The 
issues and problems related to third world development can be 
seen at various levels. There are different socio-economic 
theories for different levels. For example, whereas world 
system theorists consider global level structural variables, 
modernization, urban bias and evolutionary theorists consider 
country level variables to explain development. Meanwhile, 
organizational and social psychological theories are useful to 
analyse development problems at the lower levels. 
But present particularism in sociological theories blinds 
a large part of the reality in developing countries by being 
confined to specific ideologies. By limiting the factors 
affecting development to the global level, world-system 
theorists deny the country-specific indigeneous factors and 
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human potentials. On the other hand, natural evolutionary 
theories ignore the effects of both exogeneous factors and 
country-specific indigeneous factors on the development of any 
country. Both approaches do not recognize any initiative or 
participation by the people in development, despite positive 
empirical evidence from developing countries. 
Another aspect of development is the link between 
economic and human development. The evolutionary theories 
imply that the development of a country is the societal 
progress which is a natural outcome. Both evolutionary 
theories and world-system theory view economic development as 
synonymous with human development; that is human development 
is an automatic outcome of economic development. The 
empirical situation shows (Table 1) that there is great 
disparity between economic and human development in a country. 
If the focus of development is the people, development should 
be the total development of the people. The economic 
development of a country is only one dimension of total 
development. 
In this context, it would be very important to analyse 
both economic and human development issues and problems at 
various levels in a comprehensive manner. Hence, this 
dissertation will focus on the effects of both exogeneous and 
endogeneous factors on the economic and human development of 
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Table 1. Indicators for economic and human development for 
selected developing countries 
Country GNP per capita Life 
U.S.$ Expectancy 
(years) 
Adult 
literacy 
% 
Infant 
mortality 
(per 1000) 
Modest GNP per capita with high human development 
Sri Lanka 400 71 87 32 
Jamaica 940 74 82 18 
Costa Rica 1,610 75 93 18 
High GNP per capita with modest human development 
Brazil 2,020 65 78 62 
Oman 5,810 57 30 40 
Saudi Arabia 6,200 64 55 70 
Source: U.N. Human Development Report, 1990. 
developing countries, including possible mechanisms of those 
effects. 
The proposed research will be a cross-sectional country 
level study. However, I expect to use panel data as much as 
possible depending on its availability. 
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Organization of Research 
This dissertation is presented in alternate format and 
will be in two parts. The Part I will focus on the study of 
the external and internal factors on economic and human 
development. The external factors include world-system 
variables such as foreign capital penetration and economic 
structure whereas democracy, industrial-agricultural disparity 
and ethnic homogeneity will be taken as internal factors. 
The Part II will focus on the possible intervening 
variables of the effects (identified in the Part I) on human 
development in developing countries. Following the papers is 
a general summary. Following the General Summary are 
references cited. 
Review of the Literature 
Mainstream sociological perspectives on development 
The notion of "progress" of society can be found in early 
western sociology. This "progress" of societies implied 
development. Ninteenth century sociologists offered different 
answers to the question of societal change and transformation 
from small, simple structures into large and complex systems. 
They produced a variety of typological schema that categorized 
the process of development into a number of discrete stages. 
According to Western sociological theorists, societies were 
conceived as developing along a linear, progressive path. 
6 
passing through successive stages, each of which Is 
characterized by particular forms of social organization 
(Hall, 1988). 
Comte (1798-1857) attempted to model sociology after the 
natural sciences and sought to explain social change using 
natural science laws ("social physics"). He believed natural 
evolution of society Is directed towards social progress. 
This process can be facilitated by needed social reforms. His 
evolutionary process consisted of three stages, namely the 
theological stage, the metaphysical stage and the posltlvlstlc 
stage. The theological stage Is based on belief In super­
natural power, whereas the metaphysical stage Is based on the 
belief In natural forces. The posltlvlstlc stage which 
started In the Seventeenth Century Is based on natural 
science. His main focus was the systematic character of 
society. Its parts, inter-relatlonshlps and functions. "Comte 
was able to place all known societies on a continuum of 
development, from the primitive tribes described by the 
explorers of America and the Orient, on through the empires of 
history, and culminating, needless to say, with nineteenth-
century France" (Collins and Makowsky, 1984:29). This view of 
social transformation greatly Influenced the later 
functionalist and organlclst views of the society. 
Extending the views of Comte on the natural progressive 
nature of society and Darwin's views on organic evolution, 
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Spencer made society analogous to an organism. Accordingly, 
Spencer's social change comes about through natural evolution. 
Both society and organisms grow with a simultaneous increase 
in complexity and structure. "Evolution is definable as a 
change from an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent 
heterogeneity accompanying the dissipation of motion and 
integration of matter" (Spencer, 1862:291). Just as in an 
organism, the three components of structure of society, 
namely, regulatory, operative and distributory are subject to 
this change. Spencer concluded the condition of homogeneity 
is an unstable condition. Just like . the conservation of 
energy in physical matter, there is a 'persisting force' in 
the society which causes spontaneous social change towards 
heterogeneity. Hence, he opposed any interventions directed 
towards societal.change. 
Durkheim also believed in a scheme of evolution of 
society from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity 
through the division of labor. Durkheim, explaining the 
evolution of society towards a well ordered system through the 
division of labor, wrote that men depend less on others as 
individuals, than on mass organisation of a well-ordered 
system (which) requires that the parts be strongly 
tied to the whole and subordinated (Durkheim, 1893). His 
views on the change of common conscience to collective 
conscience and the change of repressive laws to restitutive 
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laws were consistent with his overall scheme of natural 
evolution of society from 'primitive' stage to industrialised 
stage with an increasing morality. Durkheim did not deny the 
need for reforms of society and did not want to see another 
French revolution but wanted order. 
Social science has displayed little interest in the 
societies which now form the third world. All sociological 
theories were directed to explain the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism in Western societies (Roxborough, 
1979). These theories did not attribute any active roles to 
the people in less developed societies in their development. 
According to these theories the less developed societies have 
to wait until the 'natural evolutionary process' brings them 
to a higher stage. "When sociology did turn its attention to 
the underdeveloped world, it was assumed implicitly by a great 
many researchers that the new nations would follow the same 
path as that taken by Western European nations, and the 
theoretical paradigms developed to explain the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe were imported 
wholesale, and with few amendments, into the study of Africa, 
Asia and Latin America" (Roxborough, 1979:13). These theories 
took for granted that all developing countries are in a fuedal 
stage as Western societies were before capitalism. 
Accordingly these theories ignore the fact that developing 
countries have different types of societies mixed with both 
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feudal and capitalist sectors. These evolutionary theories 
justified the superiority of colonial powers and their 
assymetrical economic and political relationships with the 
less developed societies in that period. Hence, these theories 
provided "expert power" which was complementary to the 
military power of the colonialists used to maintain the "law 
and order" in their colonies. "In the nineteenth century, a 
matured version of the notion of progress fused with 
evolutionary concepts in biology to produce social theories 
which justified European "superiority" and imperial domination 
and, at the same time, offered the prospect of progress to 
societies that were then regarded as primitive." (Hall, 
1988:13). But this 'prospect' has not materialized. 
Instead, there is continued unemployment, increased 
income inequality within and among nations, and the stagnation 
of real income levels among the poorest. The common theme 
that animates all of these criticisms is that the benefits of 
the orthodox strategy of development have failed to "trickle 
down" to the poor of the world (Wilber and Jameson, 1984). 
Max Weber attempted to explain societal development using 
rationality of religion in addition to economic and political 
factors. He wanted "...to clarify the part which religious 
forces have played in forming the developing web of our 
specifically worldly modern culture..."(Weber, 1930:90). He 
believed religion, society and individuals are more rational 
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in Europe than in other countries. He overemphasized the 
effect of Protestantism on societal development. His main 
conclusion that appeared in his "The Religion of China," "The 
Religion of India" and "Ancient Judaism" was that the mixture 
of the ethical and scientific rationalism gave the impetus for 
rationalizing social institutions and changing the world in 
the economic and political upheavals of modernity. He found 
that Confucianism, Brahminism, Buddhism, and Islam entwined 
with a patrimonial order of stratification so they 
strengthened the unpredictable, irrational aspects of their 
societies rather than weakened them (Collins and Makovsky, 
1984). But contrary to his views, the most rapid growth of 
science and development were seen in non-protestant countries 
in Europe. Weber's causes for underdevelopment, 
irrationality, have been considered within the context.of 
rational organizations. He denied the fact that basic 
features of this type of organization, such as simplification, 
standardization and centralization are not compatible with the 
ideas, physical environment, complexity, diversity and 
uniqueness of those societies. Then the problem is not the 
unavailability of needed 'rationality' in less developed 
societies but the belief in the universal applicability of 
rigid ideal type organizations. Accordingly, Weber's views on 
development do not recognize flexible unique national and 
local development interventions in developing societies. 
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Parsons (1951) considered society as a system with a 
structure comprised of Inter-related parts that fulfill 
different functions. He believed that a society Is analogeous 
to an economic system. Like Spencer he believed society 
changes by differentiation through the division of labor. The 
productivity and efficiency of the society Increase with 
differentiation. Parsons believed, like Durkhelm, a cultural 
system changes with a change of social structure. He 
Introduced five 'pattern variables' that determine how people 
choose their behaviors depending on the situation. Parsons 
attempted to introduce a framework for the comparative study 
of different societies. His pattern variables were: 1. 
achievement vs ascription; 2. specificity vs diversity; 3. 
unlversallsm vs particularism; 4. quality against performance 
and 5. self-orientation vs collective orientation. Drawing on 
Tonnies Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft dichotomy, Talcott Parsons 
developed his five pairs of pattern variables(Roxborough, 
1979). Hoselitz (1960) argued that this scheme of variables 
can be used for comparative study of economies or behavior 
related to production of goods and services in different 
societies. Many writers have objected to the assumption of the 
validity of the dichotomy of these variables in relation to 
traditional and modern societies. Even if one accepts the 
Parsonian contention, the validity of such a dichotomy is 
itself open to question (Frank, 1969). Parsons argued that 
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religion changes from a particularistic nature in primitive 
religions to universalistic world religions according to his 
scheme. Historically, societies could change with the change 
of their value systems. There is a normative order of a 
society and a stability based on the existing value system. 
Hence, this structural functionalism exaggerates societal 
consensus, stability and integration and, conversely, 
tends to disregard conflict, disorder and change (Abrahamson, 
1978). Parsons and other structural functionalist theorists 
give a very passive role to people in societal change. "Human 
beings are as much engaged in using social systems as in being 
used by them"(Gouldner, 1970:220). Further critisizing the 
conservative bias of structural functionalism, Gouldner writes 
that Parsons persistently sees the partlyfilled glass of water 
as half-full rather than half-empty. This conservative 
flavored structural functionalism operates in support of the 
status quo and dominant elites (Ritzer, 1983). Hence, 
Parson's structural functionalism does not support any 
interventional progressive changes in the society other than 
natural evolutionary changes. 
For Marx (1852), according to dialectics, the inherent 
conflicts in feudal and capitalist societies cause inevitable 
revolutions which restructure the political and legal system. 
This historical transformation is inherent due to the 
contradiction between ths mode of production and production 
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relations in feudal or in capitalist societies. The mode of 
production is the progressive force in social change. The 
capitalists in fuedal societies and working class in 
capitalist societies have a historical responsibility to 
effect this change. Class interests and class consciousness 
are necessary conditions for these revolutionary changes. 
Marx believed that unity of the working class through 
political organizations can facilitate this historical social 
change. He said that the proletarian revolution would happen 
first in England where capitalism was developed. But the 
revolution really happened not in England but in Russia. His 
dichotamization of society into two classes and inevitable 
class conflict and revolution are too simplified as mechanisms 
for societal transformation in complex but less developed 
societies. His theory is totally based on economic 
determinism and an historical natural evolutionary process. 
He ignored the diversity, complexity and uniqueness of 
different societies. As other Western evolutionary theories, 
Marxism assumes the fuedal-capital dichotomy in evolutionary 
process which ignore the reality of developing societies which 
contain both a mixture of fuedal and capitalist sectors. 
Later, Trotsky (1931) argued in his theory of permanent 
revolution that there is a possibility of having a revolution 
directly from fuedal society to socialist society by skipping 
the stage of capitalism if the fuedal societies have mixed 
14 
with some capitalist elements. However, according to Marxism 
in general, there is no possibility of interventions of people 
in development in a feudal or capitalist society except for 
facilitating the corresponding historical revolution only 
under appropriate subjective conditions. 
Marx explained the process of capital accumulation 
through surplus value generated in a capitalist society. Also, 
he was empirically correct, by saying that accumulation of 
capital with development of the capitalism would cross the 
boundaries of the nations(Marx, 1965). That is capital would 
accumulate in Western societies at the expense of less 
developed societies. Marx argued that development of the 
world capitalist system is the force which links the fates of 
developed and less developed societies (Marx, 1965). 
Accordingly, Lenin argued that highest stage of capitalism is 
imperialism. The declining rate of profit in the metropolis 
meant that, with the opening up of the colonies, there were 
more profitable investment opportunities abroad. Then there 
would be outflow of capital to the colonies (Lenin, 1966). 
But in reality, this type of outflow of capital could be seen 
mainly towards some of the Asian colonies. However, there are 
various forms of imperialism through formation of world 
markets (Roxborough, 1979). 
Robert Nisbet, discussing mainstream sociological 
theories on societal change writes, " Turn to history and only 
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to history if what we are seeking are the actual causes, 
sources and conditions of overt changes of patterns and 
structures in society. Conventional wisdom to the contrary in 
modern social theory, we shall not find the explanation of 
change in those studies which are abstracted from history; 
whether these be studies of small groups in the social 
laboratory, group dynamics generally, staged experiments in 
social interaction, or mathematical analyses of so-called 
social systems. Nor will we find the sources of change in 
contemporary revivals of the comparative method with its 
ascending staircase of cultural similarities and differences 
plucked from all space and time" (Nisbet, 1969). 
Contemporary Theories on Development 
in Developing Countries 
Modernization Theory 
Modernization theory (Hoselitz, 1960 Rostow, 1960), which 
was a recent manifestation of the evolutionary funtionalist 
paradigm along with social psychological ideas or concepts, 
also introduced four stages of development. This evolutionary 
process changed the "traditional" societies to "modern" 
societies through intermediate stages. These stages are: 1. 
Traditional society characterized by low level technology, low 
productivity, a rigid social structure and fatalistic 
attitude; 2. A "pre-take off" stage in which traditional values 
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and attitudes change through the Introduction of modern 
technology and scientific knowledge; 3. A "take-off" stage in 
which the remaining of traditional culture disappear and the 
sustained economic growth gets established; and 4. A final 
stage which is characterized by a high level of living, 
comparable to modern industrial societies. This model is 
comparable to Tonnie's (1957) Gemeinschaft and Gessellschaft 
model and to Parson's (1951) pattern variables model. 
According to the proposed model, the modernization school 
argued that development will occur by the provision of needed 
capital and technology to less developed countries by 
developed countries. It was assumed these aids are readily 
available through the generosity of developed countries 
(Stockwell and Lailaw, 1981). Modernization theorists 
believed that the notion of traditionalism of less developed 
societies impede the development of their societies via 
introducing technology and promoting industrialization. 
Hence, traditional institutions in these societies should be 
replaced by compatible institutions as a prerequisite for 
development. Modernization theory emphasized Weber's 
'rationalization' of economic and social institutions in less 
developed countries to facilitate the modernization process 
following Western countries. Most of the bi-lateral and multi­
lateral loans and aids provided to less developed countries 
have been based on these modernization principles. Use of 
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modernization principles is a subordination of social, 
cultural and behavioral elements in these societies. "The 
diffusion of capital, technology and varies elements of social 
structure from the advanced countries to underdeveloped areas 
has often hindered the development of the latter rather than 
promoting it" (Frank, 1969). 
Dependencv/World-svstem Theorv 
Extending the issue of international capital accumulation 
through various forms (world trade, technology, and capital 
penetration etc.), the Latin American dependency school 
outlined three main forms of investments by 'advanced' 
countries in less developed countries. Those forms are: 1. 
Raw material extraction and cash cropping; 2. Manufacturing 
plants to produce for local markets (elite customers); and 3. 
Labor-intensive manufacturing plants in global assembly lines 
(Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985). Hence the dependency 
school argued that the 'advanced' countries could achieve high 
levels of development due to their dominant position in the 
world economy while constraining the development of less 
developed countries or a resulting 'dependent development'. 
That is, "contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the 
historical product of past and continuing economic and other 
relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now 
developed metropolitan countries" (Frank, 1969:4). Dos Santos 
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(1984) defined the dependency as a situation in which the 
economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development 
and expansion of another economy to which the former is 
subjected. The relation of interdependenccy between two or 
more economies and between these and world trade assumes the 
form of dependence when some countries can expand and can be 
self-sustaining while other countries can do this only as a 
reflection of that expansion which can have either a positive 
or negative effect on their immediate development. That is, 
development and underdevelopment can be seen as two sides of a 
single global process based on world division of labor. This 
world division of labor can be analysed in terms of 
relationship between the centre (developed) and periphery 
(less developed). The core/periphery relationship has existed 
in different forms during last five centuries with continous 
expansion and further deepening (Wallerstein, 1974). The main 
mechanisms that reproduce the core/periphery power 
differential are the processes of state formation, uneven 
class formation and unequal exchange (Chase-Dunn and Rubinson, 
1977). Dependency theory implies that external factors are 
the most important obstacles for development in less developed 
countries. The less developed countries are trapped in 
existing dependency structures. Hence, it is necessary for 
less developed countries to dissociate from the world market 
and strive for self-reliance (Friberg and Hettne, 1985). 
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Wallerstein (1974, 1977) taking world system as his unit 
of analysis, stressed that whatever happens in countries is 
explained by the contradictions in the system as a whole. The 
global world-system is defined primarily by circulation of 
capital. The characteristic of world capitalist system is its 
globality. This world system determines the social structure 
in a country. It does not give any autonomy to interior 
forces in a country. There is no distinction between interior 
and exterior forces. The latter determines the former. There 
are limited possibilities of transformation of less developed 
societies within the capitalist world-economy. It is a matter 
of changing the structural position from a peripheral to a 
semi-peripheral one, a possibility that is open to a few. We 
can speak only of social change in the social world system. 
The globalization of development by world-system theory, 
can be regarded as an effort to go beyond dependency to create 
a framework in which both the centre and periphery, as well as 
the relations between them , are considered (Friberg and 
Hettene, 1985). In contrast, in many dependency analyses the 
external situation of dependence is taken more or less as 
given and the main focus of study is the internal processes of 
the dependent society and its interactions with external 
processes (taking a country as the unit of analysis). This 
contrasts with world-system perspective in which world 
economy and its dynamics are taken as the starting point 
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(Bornschler and Chase-Dunn, 1985). However, the external 
factors are taken as the determinants of development of less 
developed countries in both dependency and world system 
theories. In this analysis, perspectives from both these 
theories are combined. 
Dependency/world system theory totally neglect the role 
of indigeneous factors in development in a country. The great 
diversity and complexity of third world countries provide 
negative empirical evidence for this stance. Mouzelis (1988) 
notes that the inadequacy of treating the third world in an 
undifferentiated manner and the need to take into account 
variations within it has become part of the conventional 
wisdom in the development field. But it is one thing to 
stress the complexity and enormous variation within the 
capitalist periphery and another to do something constructive 
about it. 
The variations in either economic development or human 
development in developing countries are not adequately 
explained by dependency/world-system theory. The economic 
development rates(GNP growth) in South Korea (6.7), Thailand 
(5.8), and Botswana (8.8) are impressive when compared 
to those of rest of the third world countries (World Bank, 
1988). On the other hand, levels of human development (a 
composite measure of both human capabilities and level of 
achieved well being of people in a country on the basis of 
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life expectancy, literacy rate and purchasing power to buy 
commidities) achieved by Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Malasia and Costa 
Rica are comparable with some of the developed countries (UN, 
1990). Dependency/world-system theory assumes that there 
would be spontaneous development in periphery countries in the 
absence of economic domination by developed countries. By 
arguing that the one great source of underdevelopment is the 
capitalist core, these theorists unavoidably imply that 
without capitalist exploitation there would be development 
(Rhyne, 1991). That is, dependency/world-system theory not 
only does not recognize non-dependent indigeneous factors such 
as geography, history, ethnicity and social structure which 
affect development but also any local initiative or any role 
of people in their development in less developed countries. 
On the other hand, all the above discussed mainstream 
sociological theories and development theories are 
deterministic. According to these theories there is no space 
for people to initiate and participate in development except 
for minor details (Friberg and Hettene, 1985). These theories 
deal either with an endogenous(evolutionary theories) or an 
exogeneous process (dependency/world-system theory) of 
development and both of these processes are deterministic and 
are also exclusive in nature. Morever, all of these theories 
assume that human development is an automatic outcome of 
economic development. 
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There are many success stories from developing countries 
showing certain possiblities ("local spaces") of raising the 
living condition of the people through grass roots level 
participatory interventions. The Grammen bank in Bangladesh, 
and the change agent program in Sri Lanka are movements which 
are involved in such interventions. These interventions use 
the 'local space' where action is generated in local 
communities: 'conscientizaton' emphasizes people as subjects 
(not as objects) of the development. Conscientization is the 
process in which human beings, not as merely recipients 
(objects) but as knowing subjects, achieve a deepening 
awareness of the sociological reality that shapes their lives 
and capacity to transform that reality (Paul Freire, 1971). 
As Galtung (1980) argued, no social structure has any 
concerted meaning unless there are people acting in the 
prescribed manner in the prescribed positions. No structure 
exits in and by itself. New structures come into being because 
people start doing new things, start dealing with each other 
in a new way. The point is only that for this to happen the 
concerted and deliberate actions of many people are needed. 
Hence, one of most important forms of social change is also 
the one least noticed by theoreticians because it is so 
obvious: structures change simply because people stop doing 
something and do something else instead. 
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PART I. EFFECTS OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS ON 
ECONOMIC AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
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INTRODUCTION 
Previous Research 
A substantial volume of research has addressed 
development issues in the Third world since the 1970's. Most 
of this research is confined to dependency or world system and 
modernization theories. This research has focused on the 
effects of the dependency related variables (independent 
variables such as foreign capital penetration and foreign 
trade) on socio-economic variables (dependent variables) such 
as economic growth, agrarian crisis, disarticulation 
(disparity between different sectors in development level and 
productivity), income inequality, overurbanization, fertility 
rates, mortality rates and political violence in developing 
countries. Past research has used diverse statistical methods 
for analyses of cross-national data, gathered from various 
sources. 
Economic development and human development 
In most of the research, the level of economic 
development of a country has been measured by Gross Domestic 
Product per capita or by Gross National Product per capita. 
Because of inaccuracies inherent in exchange rates, use of 
exchange rates systematically overestimates the inequality 
between countries when GNP per capita is used as a measure of 
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economic development (Peacock and Hoover, 1988). Some 
researchers avoid this problem by measuring economic 
development using other indicators such as energy consumption 
per capita (Muller, 1988). Most of the research on 
development in developing countries has concentrated on the 
effects of world system variables such as foreign investment 
penetration, trade structures, and foreign debts on economic 
development (Bradshaw, 1987; Timberlake, 1980). These studies 
show that there are negative effects of world system variables 
on the economic development of developing countries. In most 
of the research, human development is measured by direct 
indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy 
rates, per capita calorie consumption, and percentage of low 
birth weight etc (Stokes, 1990; Wimberley, 1990). Much 
research has shown that there are significant negative effects 
of world system variables on infant mortality and life 
expectancy (Lenski and Nolan, 1984; Nolan and White, 1983; 
Sell and Kunitz, 1987). 
Although there is little research on the relationship 
between economic development and human development, available 
findings are contradiictory. Shin (1975) found that 
development level explains only 20 percent of the variance of 
infant mortality. Literature from the World Bank (1988) 
showed that Burma, with a per capita GNP of less than $200, 
and Sri Lanka, with less than $400 per capita GNP have 
26 
longevity and infant mortality measures comparable to those of 
Brazil and Mexico which have six to ten times the per capita 
GNP. Todaro (1981) found that national economic growth is not 
always reflected in increased well-being among the poor. Some 
Third World countries that underwent rapid economic growth in 
the 1960s and 1970s simultaneously experienced greater 
unemployment and income inequality. Warnock (1987) observed 
that economic growth in Brazil is accompanied by a decline in 
real wages and increase in infant mortality. Firebaugh (1980) 
concluded that the relationship between income distribution 
and standard of living (which are proxies for human 
development) varies substantially across nations. 
Modernization theorists argue that the relationship 
between economic development and income distribution (proxy 
for human development) is curvilinear (Kuznets, 1955; 
Hirshman, 1958). Paukert (1973) and Rubinson (1976) found 
evidence for this thesis by plotting the GNP of various 
nations against various indices of inequality. A partial 
analysis of previous studies, avoiding specification error, 
demonstrated a moderately strong curvilinear relationship 
between economic development and income inequality (Weede, 
1980). But some research (Adelman and Morris, 1973) observed 
there is no such pattern and concluded that development level 
has only secondary and minor effects on equity. 
These contradictory results might be due to the 
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difference In the selection of controlling variables for the 
analyses. Hence, It Is useful to examine the correspondence 
between the economic development level and human development 
Indicators net of established contributing factors such as 
world system variables, democracy and rarely considered 
Indigenous variables such as ethnic homogeneity. 
Foreign capital penetration 
Dependency or World system theories contend that foreign 
Investment penetration affects economic growth of developing 
countries adversely while basic needs proponents show that it 
adversely affects the health and nutritional status of the 
people. Modernization theorists argue that foreign investment 
penetration contributes to the economic growth of developing 
countries. 
Summarizing several country studies and theoretical 
works, (Frank, 1969; George, 1977; Moran, 1978), Wlmberely 
(1990) writes that foreign investment penetration has 
distorted development in developing countries through the 
following processes: 
(1) Slowing economic growth, owing to such factors as 
decapitalization and displacement of domestic firms by 
the multinational corporations; 
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(2) Promoting Income inequality, often in the interest of 
politically and economically powerful foreign investors; 
(3) Obstructing progressive domestic political processes 
in developing countries that are contrary to core 
economic interests; 
(4) Diverting land from food production for domestic use 
and displacing poor farmers who have few alternatives for 
livelihood; and 
(5) Corrupting local consumer tastes. 
Many Dependency or World system theorists argue that 
investment dependency is more important than other kinds of 
dependency (e.g., trade) for exploitation of post-colonial 
developing countries (Dos Santos, 1970; Frank, 1969). 
Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985), in a study of cross-
national data for developing countries, found foreign 
investment affects economic growth of developing countries 
adversely. They observed that this effect was mediated by an 
increase in income inequality, low growth of foreign capital 
and a decrease of domestic investment of developing countries. 
London and Williams (1988) showed there is a significant 
negative effect of foreign capital penetration on the 
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Physical Quality of life index which is a composite measure of 
basic needs satisfaction. Evans and Timberlake (1980), using 
cross-national data noted that high levels of economic 
inequality found in less developed countries have been 
attributed to the penetration of their economies by 
investments of multinational enterprises based in developed 
countries of the West. They suggested that foreign investment 
results in high levels of inequality by distorting the 
evolution of the labor force structure. Third World economies 
penetrated by foreign capital will have unusually rapidly 
growing proportions of the labor force employed in the 
tertiary, and it is the growth of this proportion that 
mediates some of the effects of dependence on inequality. 
Bornscheir and Chase-Dunn (1985) showed that income inequality 
caused by foreign investment penetration affects economic 
growth of developing countries through a decrease in the rate 
of growth of stock of foreign capital and a subsequent 
decrease of domestic investment percentage. 
Marshal and Schwartz (1984), using an analysis of cross-
national data from 85 developing countries, examined the 
hypothesis that declining per capita food production in the 
periphery results from its incorporation into the capitalist 
world economy. Investment dependence creates strong demand 
for foreign exchange which, for most of the periphery can only 
be met by developing the agricultural export sector of the 
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economy. This development is not compatible with peasant food 
production and thereby creates an "agrarian crisis" and food 
shortage in developing countries. Food shortages can result 
in malnutrition and poor health conditions. Marshal and 
Schwartz concluded that data supported the hypothesis and 
their finding extends the analytical potential of dependency 
or world-system theory. 
London and Robinson (1989), using regression analysis of 
cross-country data, showed that foreign capital penetration by 
multinational companies contributed to increased political 
violence both directly and indirectly, through its effect on 
income inequality. Although they did not mention that 
political violence contributes to the adverse effects of 
foreign capital penetration on economic growth and human 
development indicators, there is a great deal of empirical 
evidence that political violence of developing countries 
adversely affects development. They argued that theoretical 
and empirical integration of internal and international 
factors yielded the most comprehensive explanation of the 
causes of collective political violence. 
Strokes and Anderson (1990) studied the effect of 
dependency and disarticulation on development in developing 
countries. They posited that the effect of disarticulation on 
basic needs was not an artifact of dependency but that 
disarticulation was the key intervening variable between 
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dependency and the social outcomes of economic growth, because 
it inhibits the spread effects generally thought to be 
associated with economic growth. 
London (1988) found that results from previous studies on 
the effect of dependency or world-system position on fertility 
trends in non-core nations were contradictory. He criticized 
the methods and procedures of previous studies and conducted 
new analyses. In a study of non-core countries, he showed 
that the dependency of the country does distort development 
and Impede fertility decline. He also demonstrated that 
national and institutional characteristics such as social-
insurance programs and concerted family-plannig programs 
contributed significantly to declines in fertility. Evans and 
Timberlake (1980) noted that investment dependency affect the 
status of women in ways that retard fertility decline. Ward 
(1984) argues that dependence results in the concentration of 
women in low-wage or informal labor markets which are 
compatible with childbearlng and promote high fertility. 
Dependency creates a situation (distorted development) in 
which children make a contribution to the family income. There 
is little motivation to limit fertility in developing 
countries because the core is benefitted by "profitable" child 
labor (Hout, 1980; Caldwell, 1980: Nolan and White, 1984). 
Hout (1980), using cross-national data from 62 countries, 
showed that the fertility reducing effect of socioeconomic 
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development is strongest only when dependence is low; it 
weakens as dependence increases because dependency 
concentrates income and thereby elite groups control the use 
of the benefits of growth. Ward (1984) found that the effect 
of dependence on fertility was small and indirect. Instead it 
only operates through intervening variables such as women's 
economic status, income inequality, and infant mortality. 
There are several studies which provide contradictory 
results on the effects of dependency on demographic 
characteristic of a country. Thomas Sowell (1983), using 
cross-national mortality data of developing countries, 
observed that the net effect of foreign capital penetration on 
mortality was beneficial to those countries. Bullock (1986) 
found that investment dependence helps lower infant mortality. 
Cartright and Adams (1984), using twenty Asian and twenty 
Latin-American countries, showed that none of fifteen 
indicators of dependence had any significant effect on 
fertility measures (crude birth rate and crude birth rate 
change), net of social development and family planning 
programs. 
The results of the study of effects of dependence on 
economic growth and on human development indicators are 
contradictory and call for more analyses. Especially, it is 
useful to examine the effects of investment dependence after 
controlling for certain country characteristics such as 
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economic structure, democratic experience and ethnic 
homogeneity. The effects of dependence have to be studied for 
different levels of certain characteristics of countries such 
as the level of economic development. Also, more research has 
to be done to identify possible mechanisms of effects of 
dependence on economic growth and on human development 
indicators. 
Economic structure and disarticulation of the economy 
Dependency or world-system theorists argue that the 
economic structure of developing countries is determined by 
the world capitalist system. Hence, the economic structure of 
a developing country is an external factor which affects 
development. This type of dependency is "structural 
dependence" on core countries. 
Developing nations have traditionally served as exporters 
of primary goods. Although the nature and value of these 
goods differ widely from nation to nation, most are marked by 
price instability, thwarting the economic development of these 
nations . This aspect of economic structure still lacks 
diversification and the potential for seIf-perpetuating growth 
(Peacock and Hoover, 1988). 
Many Third World farmers produce a variety of primary 
commodities (e.g., coffee, tea and cotton) that are 
"purchased" by the government and exported. These farmers may 
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be damaged by low international prices or by other unfavorable 
circumstances such as drought or famine which affect 
agricultural production, leading to rural-urban migration and 
inhibiting economic growth (Bradshaw 1987). Several studies 
found that raw material export and commodity concentration 
inhibit economic development in developing countries 
(Delacroix and Ragin, 1981). 
On the other hand, a large part of the agriculture sector 
in developing countries is comprised of traditional peasant 
food production. Marshal and Schwartz (1984), using data from 
85 developing countries, showed that investment dependence 
creates a strong demand for foreign exchange which for most of 
the periphery can only be met by developing the agricultural 
export sector of the economy. Hence the modernization of 
agriculture biases production towards exportables. This 
development is incompatible with traditional peasant 
agriculture. 
An important feature associated with the structure of the 
economy of developing countries is the disarticulation of the 
economy. Disarticulation is characterized by weak or missing 
links between economic sectors (Amin, 1976). This distortion 
of structure is usually between industrial and agricultural 
sectors because the agricultural sector utilizes traditional 
and labor intensive techniques whereas the industrial sector 
utilizes modern technology. Hence, developed sectors are 
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unable to use inputs from traditional sectors (Stokes, 1990). 
Marshal and Schwartz (1984) show that the most general 
consequence of disarticulation is the distortion of domestic 
purchasing power arising from concentration of income in the 
hands of a small number of people. The domestic market is 
extremely limited and production is distorted toward luxury 
goods consumed by the wealthy or exported back to the core. 
This sectorial inequality can be considered as a proxy for 
income inequality of developing countries (Jackman 1975). 
This sectorial inequality is very closely associated with the 
urban-rural income inequality. 
Lipton (1977) shows that the investment-output ratio in 
the non-agricultural sector is about double that of the 
agriculture sector in developing countries. Government 
policies (pricing and related policies) which are biased 
towards urban areas have produced rural-urban migration and 
increased inequality. Griffin (1977) argues that in order to 
reduce rural-urban income inequality and national output, the 
resources should be reallocated to the agriculture sector for 
higher productivity. Amin (1975) argues that the root of 
disarticulation is dependency of developing countries on 
capital and on export. 
The modern sector in developing countries gets favorable 
attention from the governments and attracts a large portion of 
available scarce capital (domestic and foreign), The 
36 
agriculture sector, especially traditional agriculture, Is 
neglected and continues to have low productivity. The 
productivity of this stagnating agricultural sector Is 
adversely affected by the population growth In rural areas. 
Also, small and cottage Industries In these countries are 
negatively affected by competition with modern sector domestic 
production (Amln, 1976). 
Although there were several studies examining the effects 
of economic structure (raw material exports and commodity 
concentration) on economic growth and human development 
Indicators, these effects have been Investigated without 
controlling for important country characteristics such as 
democratic experience and ethnic homogeneity and for other 
world system variables such as foreign capital penetration. 
It is necessary to perform analyses after controlling for the 
above variables in order to Identify primacy of variables. 
Also studies are Inadequate with regard to the mechanisms of 
the effects of economic structure on economic growth and on 
human development indicators through possible intervening 
variables such as women's education, contraceptive use, 
fertility and the disparity between agriculture sector and 
industrial sector. Following sections include separate 
discussions on the importance of Internal and external 
factors, affecting economic and human development. 
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Democratic experience of developing countries 
Dependency or World system theorists argue that the 
governments (state and politics) in developing countries are 
imbedded in deeply structured forces of world capitalism. 
Governments are representations of the small elite class who 
serve the capitalist system. States are derivatives of class 
structure, conceived in terms of level of development, class 
structure and level of foreign capital penetration. Hence 
states in developing countries have no autonomy for the 
formulation and implementation of appropriate development 
policies. Instead governments are compelled to create 
favorable conditions for foreign investments including 
favorable tax and exchange rate, anti-inflationary government 
policies, political stability, minimal labor unrest and demand 
structure favoring income concentration (Kohli et al, 1984). 
On the other hand, some development activists argue that 
a democratic political system is necessary for economic and 
human development in developing countries. States have a 
degree of autonomy to implement appropriate development 
policies for economic and human development in developing 
countries. Thus the development strategy of the government is 
the crucial variable determining the course of income 
distribution. It is consistent with the assumption that state 
authorities do in fact make choices of far-reaching importance 
for the societies they govern (Kohli et al., 1984). 
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Therefore, types of government do make a difference. The 
actions of democratic regimes are different from those of 
authoritarian ones. Politics and capacities of democratic 
governments are oriented to pursue policies in a manner more 
or less autonomous of class and capital. These governments 
are more accountable to people. A cross-sectional correlation 
between democracy and less inequality, after control for 
economic development was found in cross national analyses 
(Weede 1980). Goulet (1989), in a case study on Brazil and 
Sri Lanka, shows that political redemocratization now 
occurring in numerous countries of Asia and Latin America 
challenges both the rule of dictators and their elitist 
development strategies. He shows that popular participation 
is necessary in transition to equitable development. 
Freire (1973) argues that when people are oppressed, they 
do not participate in their own humanization. Conversely, 
when they participate, thereby becoming active subjects of 
knowledge and action, they engage in processes of development. 
A case study on Sri Lanka, where people have enjoyed 
universal franchise for more than fifty years, showed that the 
preponderance of peasantry and low income groups in the 
electorates has resulted in re-distributive policies which 
have effected sizeable transfers of income. Because the 
egalitarian pressures have increasingly taxed the higher 
income groups, government has not yet been able to broaden the 
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tax base to siphon some part of the Incremental Incomes of the 
peasantry and other self-employed (Marga, 1979). The same 
study Indicated that social policies of the governments were 
generally directed at winning the support of urban working 
class and peasantry. It showed that the proportion of total 
income had shifted in favor of the rural areas as a result of 
government policies. Sri Lanka has achieved encouraging 
results in the field of education, health, nutrition, regional 
dispersal of growth, rural and urban balance and Income 
distribution as a result of government policies. 
Few quantitative research studies focus on the effects of 
democracy on economic growth and on human development in 
developing countries. Muller (1988) concluded that there 
should be a strong association between the level of economic 
development and years of democracy because almost all old 
democracies have very high levels of development. Most of the 
research on democracy has focused on the relationship between 
democracy and Income inequality which might be a mediating 
variable between democracy and development level of developing 
countries. Stack (1978) and Weede (1982) demonstrated that 
there is a negative effect of level of democracy on Income 
Inequality. Hewitt (1977) showed that there is strong 
negative correlation between years of democracy and the size 
of the share of the income received by richest quintlie in 25 
industrialized nations. Weede and Tlefenbach (1981) found 
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that the effect of democracy on inequality varied across 
different samples. They observed there wss a significant 
negative effect in smaller samples whereas no significant 
effect was found in larger samples. Bollen and Granjean 
(1981) reported no significant effect of democracy on income 
inequality. Also Bollen and Jackman (1980) showed there was 
no reciprocal effect between level of democracy and income 
distribution. 
There are disagreements on the measurements of democracy. 
Muller argues that any measure of democracy at a single point 
in time, no matter how reliable and valid, is insensitive to a 
country's experience of democracy over time. Hence a measure 
of democracy should be longitudinal, and the length of the 
time that democratic institutions have existed should be taken 
into consideration to measure democracy. Further, Muller 
argues that a reason for the failure to find a significant 
negative effect of level of democracy on income inequality 
could be the confounding influence of new democracies. In 
such countries, sufficient time has not elapsed for the 
institutions of democracy, operating through mediating 
variables such as strong trade unions and socialist parties to 
have exerted an egalitarian effect on the distribution of 
income. Research on the effect of democracy is confined to 
some case studies in a few countries and to very few cross-
national studies mainly on the effect on income inequality in 
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developing countries. The results are contradictory. Also 
the regression analyses used to examine the effect of 
democracy have not controlled world system variables such as 
foreign investment penetration and structure of the economy. 
Hence the issue of primacy of external factors in relation to 
democracy of a country, that is whether democracy of a country 
is a product of external factors, has been avoided in the 
analyses. It is useful to test the effect of democratic 
experience of a country on economic development and on human 
development net of world-system variables and possible 
indigenous variables. Also, more research has to be done to 
identify the mechanisms of the effects of democracy on 
development indicators. 
Ethnic homoaeneitv 
Ethnic groups are self-conscious collectivities of people 
who, on the basis of a common origin or a separate subculture, 
maintain a distinction between themselves and outsiders 
(Hraba, 1979). Ethnic groups may be either cultural or racial 
and are often territorially segregated. Ethnic conflicts 
(inter-group rivalries) and ethnic stratification between 
groups in terms of wealth and power are widespread in 
developing countries. World system theorists believe that 
ethnic differentiation in most of the developing countries is 
result of processes controlled by the highly organized 
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societies in developed countries. 
It is the operation of the world market forces which 
accentuate ethnic differences, institutionalize them, and make 
them impossible to surmount over the short run (Wallerstein 
1979). Further, Wallerstein argues that ethnic affiliations 
are linked to political groupings or positions, and are often 
linked to occupation. Hence ethnic groups, kind of status 
groups, are blurred collective representation of classes. 
Although research on the effect of ethnic homogeneity on 
development is scant, there is empirical evidence in several 
African and Asian countries that ethnic confrontations have 
severely affected the development efforts. Ethnic 
confrontations have contributed to very large military budgets 
in developing countries. 
On the other hand ethnic segregation has impeded 
development efforts due to resulting spatial and regional 
disparities. Newly independent governments have to give 
considerable emphasis to links between ethnically different 
regions (Lattre, 1991). Ethnic stratification may have 
contributed to social and income disparities in developing 
countries. 
Lack of ethnic differences might have contributed to high 
nationalism among the people in some countries. A higher level 
of development in these developing countries such as Korea may 
be partially attributed to nationalistic values and attitudes 
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of the people. This apparent relationship between nationalism 
in more ethnically homogeneous countries and relatively higher 
level of development calls for research on this area. Hence, 
it is useful to examine the direct and indirect effects of 
ethnic homogeneity on economic and human development 
indicators, net of other important contributing factors. 
Hvpotheses 
The following hypotheses will be tested in the Part I of 
the study. 
1. The higher the level of foreign capital investment in a 
developing country, the lower will be the economic 
development, net of other factors. The differential effect of 
foreign capital penetration, depending on the level of 
economic development and democracy of countries, will also be 
investigated. 
2. The larger the relative size of the agricultural sector in 
a developing country, the lower will be the economic 
development, net of other factors. Differential effects of 
economic structure,depending on level of economic development 
and democracy of the countries will also be examined. 
3. The greater the disparity between the productivity of the 
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agricultural sector and that of the industrial sector in a 
developing country, the lower will be the economic 
development, net of other factors. 
4. The less experience in democracy by the people in a 
developing country, the less will be the economic development 
in a developing country, net of other factors. 
5. The less the ethnic homogeniety in a developing country, 
the less will be the economic development in a developing 
country, net of other factors. 
6 - 10. Five comparative hypotheses, similar to hypotheses 1 
to 5, will be tested for human development index in developing 
countries instead of economic development as the dependent 
variable. 
The effects of investigated factors on different 
dimensions of human development will be examined by 
considering single human development indicators such as life 
expectancy, infant mortality and literacy as well as the U.N. 
composite scale of human development. 
11. The higher the level of economic development, the higher 
will be the level of human development in a developing 
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country, net of other factors. 
These hypotheses are represented in the theoretical 
models shown in Figure 1. 
Capital Penetration >-
Eoonomio Structure >-
Agri-Ind Disparity >-
Ethnic Homogeneity >-
Lagged Economic Dev. >-
Democratic Participation -> 
Economic Development 
/Human Development 
Figure 1. Theoretical models to be tested for economic 
development and for human Development 
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METHODOLOGY 
Sources of Data 
Cross national socio-economic political data for ninety 
developing countries, excluding planned economies and 
countries with population of less than one million, from 
various sources will be used for the analyses. Planned 
economies were excluded because data are not compatible with 
the data from other countries. 
The sources of data are 
1. World Bank Annual Reports 
2. World Food and Agriculture Organization reports 
3. UNESCO Annual Reports 
4. World Health Organization annual reports 
5. Human Development report, UNCD. 
6. United States Agriculture Department - Report on 
World Agriculture. 
7. Third World Encyclopedia. 
8. International Labor Organization annual reports 
9. Transnational Corporations and Underdevelopment 
by Bornscheir and Chase-Dunn 
10. American Sociological Review - Gini coeficients 
for income inequality developed by E.N.Muller 
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Measures 
Some of the measures to be used in the analyses are the 
following. 
Economic development 
This is measured by the natural logarithm of per capita 
gross national production (GNP) of a country taken from World 
Bank report 1988. GNP is the total domestic and foreign 
output claimed by residents and is calculated without making 
deduction for depreciation. The natural logarithm is used due 
to the high skewness of GNP figures across developing 
countries. When the natural logarithms of the independent 
variable and dependent variables are used in regression 
analysis, the regression coefficient shows the percentage 
change in the dependent variable explained by every percentage 
change of the independent variable. 
Human development 
This is measured by a human development indicator, which 
is a composite scale developed by the United Nations (1990) 
using life expectancy, adult literacy and purchasing power of 
the people to buy commodities for satisfying basic needs. To 
construct a composite index, a minimum value and a desirable 
value had to be specified for each of three indicators. The 
minimum and desirable values are the end-points of a scale 
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indexed from one to zero for each measure of deprivation. 
Placing a country at the appropriate point on each scale and 
averaging the three scales gives its average human deprivation 
index, which when subtracted from 1 gives the human 
development index (HDI). 
Although there is a theoretical basis for the computation 
of this index, use of this index in regression analyses would 
obscure important differences among countries with respect to 
separate components of this index as these components are not 
very highly correlated. Hence, separate analyses for life 
expectancy and for literacy (part II) will be performed as 
well. 
Economic structure 
This is measured by the percentage of production of 
agriculture sector out of total gross domestic production in a 
country. The agriculture sector comprises agriculture, 
forestry, hunting, and fishing. The data were taken for 1965 
(early point in time) from the World Development Report (World 
Bank 1988). The data were taken for an early point in time 
because economic structure is intended to be used as a one of 
causal variables for the output variables, economic 
development and human development at later times (1985 and 
1990 respectively). 
As agriculture is the largest sector in most developing 
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countries, its percentage of the total economy would reflect 
the size of the rural sector and also the dependency of 
country economy on agriculture only. However, some of the 
production of subsistence agriculture in developing countries 
are not valued and not included in national production 
figures. Hence, the measure for economic structure may 
underestimate the relative size of the agricultural sector in 
developing countries. 
Disparity between agricultural and industrial sectors 
This will be measured by the ratio of productivity of 
the industrial sector to that of the agricultural sector in a 
country. The productivity of a sector can be computed by the 
ratio of percentage of gross domestic product of the sector to 
percentage of total labor force in that sector. A country has 
a high value of this index when its industrial sector is more 
productive than its agricultural sector. As almost all 
agricultural areas are rural and industrial areas are urban in 
developing countries, this measure indicates the rural-urban 
disparity ('dualism') and urban bias of the country. 
This measure was computed following Lipton (1977) except 
only the industrial sector was investigated rather than the 
non-agricultural sector which was used in the computation of 
his index of rural-urban disparity. As some of the non-
agricultural sectors such as mining are mostly found in rural 
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areas, it is more accurate to compare the productivity of the 
industrial sector (not the whole non-agricultural sector) with 
that of the agricultural sector to measure the rural-urban 
disparity. 
This measure was computed using World Bank (1988) data for 
1965 because this variable is supposed to be used as an 
independent or intervening variable. Lagged time would allow 
for this disparity to make any impact on dependent development 
indicators. 
Foreign capital penetration 
This is measured by (Bornscheir and Chase-Dunn, 1985) the 
total book value of the stock of foreign direct investment at 
the end of 1967, weighted by the amount of domestic capital 
stock of the country and the size of the population. 
In order to assess the long-term effects of investment 
dependence mentioned by Dependency theorists, it is beneficial 
to use investment at an earlier time. Use of Bornscheir and 
Chase-Dunn's foreign investment index allows these analyses. 
This index is based on the stocks of direct investment from 16 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
member countries in 1967. This index has been used by several 
studies (London and William, 1988; London, 1988; Stokes, 1990; 
Wimberely, 1990). 
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Democratic experience 
An authoritarian-democracy scale is created to measure 
the level of democracy. This scale takes into account the 
period of time a country has enjoyed stable democracy. That 
is the period of time, people have participated in choosing 
governments and democratic institutions have functioned. 
Bollen (1980) developed a continous index to measure 
level of democracy of a country which ranges from 0-100. 
Muller (1988) used the years of democratic experience of a 
country for his study on democracy and income equality. I 
attempt to take both the period of time of democratic 
experience and the type of non democratic governments into 
account for this authoritarian-democratic scale. This ordinal 
level measure of democratic experience was developed as 
follows. 
Dictatorship (at least 75% of the period 
since 1966 or since independence) = l 
Centrally planned countries or life long/military 
leaders with or without one party or similar regime 
at least 75% of the period since 1966 or independence = 2 
Countries with one party elections (civilian leaders) 
at least 75% of the period since 1966 or independence = 3 
Countries with multi party elections 
for more than 20 years and less than 30 years = 4 
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Countries with multi party elections 
for more than 30 years = 5 
All other countries with disrupted democracies 
since indepnedence = 3 
A high score indicates long democratic experience of a 
country whereas a low score refers to an authoritarian 
country. 
Ethnic homogeneity 
A scale included in the Third World Encyclopedia to 
measure the ethnic homogeneity of a country using percentages 
of different ethnic groups in the country will be used. The 
scale ranges from 0 to 100, showing the minimum score in 
Tanzania(7%) and maximum score in Korea(100%). 
A high score of this scale indicates that most of the 
people in that country belong to the same ethnic group. That 
is minorities are numerically small and do not participate in 
national level decision making or in struggles for more power 
and autonomy. Hence, with a higher value on the ethnic 
homogeneity index, there might be more national consensus on 
policies and less internal conflicts in a country. 
The Infant mortality rate 
The infant mortality rate is the number of infants who 
die before one year of age, per thousand live births in a 
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given year. Data are from United Nations for 1986 (World 
Bank, 1988). This is a sensitive indicator of the living 
condition of people. 
Daily calorie supply per capita 
This is calculated by dividing calorie equivalent of the 
food supply in a country by the population. The data used are 
from the Food and Agriculture Organization for 1986. 
Primary education 
This is calculated by dividing the number enrolled in 
primary schools divided by the population of school-age 
children. These data are from UNESCO. 
Analyses 
This analysis covers the period from 1965 to 1988. This 
period is sufficient for the independent variables measured at 
an earlier point in time to make an impact on outcome 
variables measured at a later point in time. Also due to high 
correlations between dependent variables at the two points in 
time, a lagged dependent variable is used in the regression 
analysis for a very conservative test. Heteroskedasticity of 
some variables is reduced by taking the natural logarithms of 
those variables. Bradshaw (1988) transformed GNP natural 
logarithmically to reduce the skewedness of the data. A 
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lagged dependent variable was Included as an independent 
variable in several studies which used regression analysis in 
order have more conservative tests (Wimberly, 1990; Bradshaw, 
1988). In this regresson analysis, natural logarithm of GNP 
in 1966 is included as an independent variable. 
There can be specification problems in regression 
analyses. The possible reciprocal effects are not considered 
in these analyses. There can be reciprocal effects between 
dependent and independent variables such as foreign investment 
and economic growth, democracy and economic growth and 
economic growth and human development etc. The possibility of 
nonlinear relationships between dependent and independent 
variables such as human development and level of economic 
development is reduced in these analyses because the sample is 
only from developing countries. 
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RESULTS 
Factors Affecting Economic Development 
Table 2 and Figure 2 show the results of regression of 
economic development level (natural log of GNP) on lagged 
economic development level and another five factors, including 
dependency variables. These regression analyses (Table 2) 
were used to test hypotheses 1 through 5. Hypothesis 1 
predicting that the higher the level of foreign capital 
investment in a developing country, the lower will be the 
economic development, was supported. Hypotheses 2 and 3 
predicting that the larger the relative size of agricultural 
sector in a developing country, and the greater the disparity 
between the productivity of the agricultural sector and that 
of industrial sector in a developing country were not 
supported. Hypothesis 4 that less experience in democracy by 
the people in a developing country will be accompanied by less 
economic development in a developing country, was supported. 
Hypothesis 5 that less ethnic homogeneity in a developing 
country will be associated with less economic development in a 
developing country was not supported. The second model in 
Table 2 includes only variables which were significant in the 
regression. .It is striking to see that there are no 
substantial effects of economic structure (percent of 
agriculture sector), disparity between the agriculture sector 
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and industrial sector and ethnic homogeneity on level of 
economic development, net of other factors in the regression. 
Hence, the hypotheses 2, 3, and 5 are not accepted. 
Democracy, capital penetration and lagged economic development 
Table 2. Linear regression of economic development level 
measure on the measures of external and internal 
factors 
Independent 
variables model 1 model 2 
Constant .500(.768) -.366(.375) 
Lagged eco. .949(.109)*** 1.08(.067)*** 
development 
Capital -.003(.002) -.003(.001)* 
penetration 
Economic -.005(.005) a 
structure 
Agri-ind 000(.007) a 
disparity 
Democracy .077(.040)* .072(.032)** 
Ethnic 002(.002) a 
homogeneity 
2 
R .850 .870 
S.E. - .389 .372 
N 54 63 
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 
Note: For each regression, unstandardized regression 
coefficients are shown with corresponding standard 
errors in parentheses. 
a = independent variable not included. 
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Eoonomio Structure 
Agri-Ind Disparity -
Ethnie Homogeneity 
Lagged Economie Dev. -
Democratic Experience 
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> 
— . 005 
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—>-
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> 
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> 
-> Economic Development 
Figure 2. Results of the model for level of economic 
development. 
of a developing country have significant effects on economic 
development, net of other factors. Hence, hypotheses 1 and 4 
cannot be rejected. Model 2 in Table 2 shows that these three 
variables explain 87 percent of the variance of level of 
economic development of developing countries. 
Differential Effects of Capital Penetration 
on Economic Development 
Interaction between capital penetration and lagged 
economic development 
Following Stroke and Anderson (1990), I examined the 
interaction between capital penetration and lagged economic 
development on the level of economic development by creating 
dummy variables representing three categories per capita GNP: 
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less than $500, between $500-$1000 and more than $1000. These 
categories had 42, 20 and 16 developing countries 
respectively. The capital penetration score was multiplied by 
each dummy variable to obtain three product terms. Hence, the 
coefficient of three product terms can be Interpreted as the 
slopes of capital penetration within each level of economic 
development (Table 3). 
Table 3. Linear regression of economic development level on 
interaction terms for capital penetration at three 
levels of lagged economic level and other factors 
Independent 
variables B 
.924(.473) 
.888(.078)*** 
.038(.031) 
.007(.001)** 
.003(.001)* 
.002(.001) 
.898 
.334 
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* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p^ .01 
Constant 
Lagged economic 
development 
Democracy 
Interaction between penetration and 
GNP < $500 
GNP = $500-1000 
GNP > $1000 
2 
R 
S.E. 
N 
Note: For each regression, unstandardized regression 
coefficients are shown with corresponding standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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For each level of economic development, the equation 
reduces to a model containing the constant, effect of lagged 
economic development, effect of democracy and effect of 
capital penetration for that specific development level. 
Table 3 shows the results of a regression with interaction 
effects of capital penetration and lagged economic development 
level. According to these results, effects of foreign capital 
penetration are more pronounced in lower levels of economic 
development. Although there are significant negative effects 
of capital penetration in the countries with GNP less than 
$1000, there is no such effect in the countries with GNP 
higher than $1000. 
Interaction between capital penetration and democracy 
Similar to interaction terms between capital penetration 
and lagged economic development, three interaction terms were 
created using three categories of democracy: Authoritarian 
regimes, partial democracies and democracies more than 30 
years. Table 4 shows the results of a regression of economic 
development on lagged economic development, democracy and 
three terms of penetration for three democracy categories. 
The results are interesting. Capital penetration has 
significant negative effect on economic development only in 
partial democracies and has no effect on economic development 
in authoritarian regimes and or in established democracies. 
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Table 4. Linear regression of economic development level on 
Interaction terms for penetration at three levels 
of democracy and other factors 
Independent 
variables B 
Constant -.430(.382) 
Lagged economic 1.076(.067)*** 
development 
Democracy .113(.057)* 
Interaction between penetration and 
Authoritarian regime -.001(.002) 
Partial democracies -.002(.001)* 
Democracies more than 30 yrs -.003(.003) 
2 
R .874 
S.E .371 
n 63 
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 
Note: For each regression, unstandardlzed regression 
coeficlents are shown with corresponding standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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Factors Affecting Human Development 
In this section tests of hypotheses 6 to 10 are reported. 
Table 5 and Figure 3 show the results of regressions of the 
Human Development Index on the same independent variables used 
in regressions of economic development. It is striking to see 
that there are no significant effects of foreign capital 
penetration and the agriculture-industrial disparity on the 
Human Development Index whereas lagged economic development, 
democracy, economic structure and ethnic homogeneity have 
significant independent effects on human development. 
Hypothesis 6 that higher levels of foreign capital investment 
in a developing country will be associated with the lower 
human development was not supported. Hypothesis 7 predicting 
that the larger the relative size of the agricultural sector 
in a developing country, the lower will be the human 
development was supported. Hypothesis 8 predicting that 
greater the disparity between the productivity of the 
agricultural sector and of the Industrial sector in developing 
country, the lower will be the human development was not 
supported. Hypothesis 9 that less experience in democracy in 
a developing country will be associated with loower human 
development in a developing country was supported. The 
hypothesis that less ethnic homogeneity in a developing 
country will be related with lower human development in a 
developing country was supported. Finally, hypothesis 11 that 
higher economic development in a developing country will be 
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Table 5. Linear regression of human development index on 
the measures of external and internal factors 
Independent 
variables model 1 model 2 
Constant 16.693 7.474 
(22.971) (22.788) 
Lagged eco. 8.420** 7.181** 
development (3.286) (3.077) 
Capital -.072 a 
penetration (.052) 
Economic -.620*** -.496*** 
structure (.147) (.145) 
Agri-ind -.302 a 
disparity (.236) 
Democracy 5.109** 5.411** 
(1.215) (1.188) 
Ethnic .121* .142** 
homogeneity (.061) (.062) 
2 
R .794 .712 
S.E. 11.569 11.700 
n 54 64 
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 
Note: For each regression, unstandardized regression 
coefficients are shown with corresponding standard 
errors in parentheses. 
a = independent variable not included. 
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associated with greater human development was supported. 
Hence hypotheses 6 and 8 were rejected and hypotheses 1, 9, 10 
and 11 were accepted. 
Capital Penetration — 
Eoonomio Structure — 
Agri-Ind Disparity — 
Ethnic Homogeneity — 
Lagged Economic Dev. -
Democratic Experience 
-.072 
- .620** 
>—I 
-.302 
.121* 
8.42** 
5.11** 
-> Human Development 
(UN Index) 
Figure 3. Results of the model for level of human 
development 
Differential Effect of Economic Structure 
on Human Development 
Interaction between economic structure and 
lagged economic development 
I examined the interaction effects between lagged 
economic development level and economic structure using a 
similar method as in the case of capital penetration. The 
results are shown Table 6. The effect of economic structure 
decreased with an increase in the level of economic 
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(relative size of the agriculture sector) on human 
developmentdevelopment. It is interesting to see that there 
is no effect of economic structure on human development in the 
countries with high economic development (GNP is more than 
$1000). 
Interaction between economic structure and democracv 
There is an interaction between democracy and economic 
structure on human development, similar analyses as in the 
case of capital penetration shows (Table 7) that there is no 
effect of economic structure (relative size of agriculture 
sector) on human development in countries with established 
democracies. 
Factors Affecting Different Dimensions 
of Human Development 
The correlates of the different components of human 
development were examined separately. Table 8 shows the 
results of regressions of separate indicators of human 
development (life expectancy, infant mortality, daily calorie 
consumption and education enrollment) on same independent 
variables as in the case of Human Development Index. Though 
composite indexes may be useful in preliminary studies, 
reliance on them precludes finding important relationships 
among their components and important differences in the causes 
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Table 6. Linear regression of Human Development Index on 
interaction terms for eco-structure at three levels 
of democracy and other factors 
I 
ndependent 
variables B 
Constant 8.280(23.196) 
Lagged economic 7.276(3.160)* 
development 
Democracy 4.903(2.244)** 
Ethnic homogeneity .145(.063)* 
Interaction between eco-structure and 
Authoritarian regimes -.510(.154)*** 
Partial democracies -.248(.086)** 
Democracies more than 20 yrs -.390(.270) 
2 
R .713 
S.E. 13.241 
n 64 
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 
Note: For each regression, unstandardized regression 
coefficients are shown with corresponding standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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Table 7. Linear regression of Human Development Index on 
interaction terms for economic structure at three 
levels of lagged economic level and other factors 
Independent 
variables B 
Constant 22.857(24.236) 
Lagged economic 4.946(3.290) 
development 
Democracy 4.235(1.361)*** 
Ethnic homogeneity .131(.061)** 
Interaction between eco-structure and 
GNP < $500 -.534(.145)*** 
GNP between $500-1000 -.413(.192)** 
GNP > $1000 -.159(.235) 
2 
R 728 
S.E 12.899 
N 64 
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 
Note: For each regression, unstandardized regression 
coefficients are shown with corresponding standard 
errors in parentheses. 
67 
Table 8. Linear regression of separate human development 
indicators on the measures of external and internal 
factors 
Independent 
variables 
Life Infant Daily 
expectancy mortality calorie 
Primary 
education 
Constant 48.414 
(8.886) 
188.66 
(47.834) 
1647.00 
(523.894) 
159.00 
(39.923) 
Lagged eco. 
development 
Capital 
penetration 
Economic 
structure 
Agri-ind 
disparity 
Democracy 
Ethnic 
homogeneity 
*** 
2.070 -20.750 
(1.271) (6.843) 
-.028 .143 
(.020) (.109) 
*** ** 
-.252 .818 
(.057) (.305) 
* 
-.164 .590 
(.091) (.490) 
** 
1.490 -6.070 
(.470) (2.529) 
.051 -.046 
(.023) (.126) 
138.360 
(74.947) 
*** 
-4.553 
(1.198) 
* 
-6.640 
(3.344) 
6.654 
(5.375) 
** 
51.100 
(27.702) 
** 
3.606 
(1.386) 
-4.375 
(5.809) 
- . 0 8 2  
(.092) 
*** 
-1.172 
(.252) 
-.551 
(.398) 
1.607 
(2.07) 
.023 
(.107) 
R 
S.E. 
n 
.750 .660 
4.476 24.091 
54 54 
.579 
263.853 
54 
.475 
19.050 
51 
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 
Note: For each regression, unstandardized regression 
coefficients are shown with corresponding standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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of these components. Such indices may be misleading (London 
and William, 1988; Wimberely, 1990). 
The regression analyses show that variance of life 
expectancy is well (72%) explained by the independent 
variables whereas 47.5% of the variance in primary education 
was explained by these variables. These analyses clearly show 
that there are harmful effects of economic structure on each 
of the human development indicators (as in the case of 
composite scale). 
Although, disparity between agriculture and industrial 
sector had no effect on composite human development index, 
there was a significant negative effect of this disparity on 
life expectancy, but not on other indicators (Table 8). 
Similarly, democracy had no significant effect on primary 
education enrollment separately, although it had beneficial 
effects on human development (Table 5) and on health and 
nutrition related indicators. Also, it is interesting to see 
that ethnic homogeneity has beneficial effects only on life 
expectancy and daily calorie consumption. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Effects of External and Internal Factors 
on Human Development 
There was no effect of agriculture-industrial disparity, 
which indicates rural-urban disparity, on level of economic 
development. This finding is contrary to Lipton's (1977) 
argument that urban bias perpetuates economic inefficiency and 
therefore inhibits economic development. Also, the lack of an 
effect of economic structure which is measured by the relative 
size of the agricultural sector on economic development is 
contrary to Lipton's urban bias theory. Although the relative 
size of agriculture sector around 50 percent in most of the 
poorest countries (GNP less than $350), their level of 
economic development (GNP) varies largely from $120 to $360. 
This might be due to the effect of other control variables 
such as democracy and ethnic homogeneity which were included 
in the analyses and to the use of a better measure of rural-
urban disparity (see under measures). 
The highly significant positive effect of lagged economic 
development on the level of economic development is not 
surprising. The countries with a low level of development 
have low levels of domestic investment and low levels of 
economic growth, although they are similar in other factors. 
This is a vicious circle in which developing countries are 
trapped. Some of the poorest countries such as Zaire, 
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Zenegal, Madagascar, Uganda, Nieger and Central African 
Republic had negative economic growth during the period of 
1965-1986. The negative effect of foreign capital penetration 
on economic development of developing countries net of other 
factors, found in regression analysis, supports dependency or 
world-system perspective. According to dependency or world-
system theorists economic dependency impedes comprehensive 
economic development of developing countries through 
distortions of the labor market (increase of the tertiary 
sector) and promotion of rural-urban migration (Ledogar, 1975; 
Timberlake and Kantor 1983). There are seven poorest 
countries (GNP less than $360) which have a capital pentration 
index of more than 50). Also this association supports 
Bornscheir and Chase-Dunn's (1985) findings that income 
inequality caused by foreign investment penetration affect 
economic growth of developing countries through a decrease in 
the growth of the stock of foreign capital and a subsequent 
decrease in the domestic investment percentage. 
The positive effect of the democratic experience of a country 
on the level economic development supports Muller's (1988) 
hypothesis (see literature review). The countries such as 
Paraguay, Brazil and Costa-Rica which have long experience in 
democracies showed GNP's of more than $1000 whereas the 25 
poorest countries (GNP less than $300) in the world have 
authoritarian types of governments except for India. These 
r 
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findings are partly supported by the observed negative 
association (Muller, 1988) between the democratic experience 
and economic inequality since high economic inequality might 
impede comprehensive development of a country. The positive 
independent effect of democracy on economic development, net 
of foreign capital penetration and economic structure of a 
country contradict the dependency perspective (Kohli et al., 
1983) which states that governments (state and politics) in 
developing countries are imbedded in deeply structured forces 
of world capitalism and they cannot make any difference. But 
this positive association supports the argument of development 
activists that when people participate in decision- making, 
thereby becoming active subjects of knowledge and action, they 
engage in processes of development (Fiere, 1973). 
The negative effect on capital penetration on economic 
development only for lower income countries shows that foreign 
capital can do more harm to weaker economies. The lack of an 
effect of capital penetration on economic development in 
higher income countries might be due to their more 
industrialized economy because capital penetration in the 
industrial sector has indirect beneficial effects rather than 
in agriculture sector. Such industrialized countries like 
Chile, Brazil, Panama and Venezuela have relatively small 
agricultural sectors, less than 30 percent, and have 
respectable level of economic development (GNP > $1000) 
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despite high foreign capital penetration. 
Lack of effects of capital penetration on economic 
development both in highly authoritarian countries and in 
highly democratic countries regardless of level of economic 
development may be due to different reasons. The size of the 
international market of authoritarian regimes (mainly small 
countries such as Bhutan, Burkon Faso, Mali, Burma, and Benin) 
are not large enough for the economy to be affected by foreign 
capital penetration although they are similar on other 
dimensions. The lack of an effect of capital penetration on 
economic development in established democracies might be 
attributed to a very low level foreign capital penetration as 
a result of strong opposition parties and trade union 
movements in those countries. Established democracies such as 
India and Paraguay have foreign capital penetration index of 
less than 20. 
The positive effect of the economic development level on 
the human development index might be attributed to the 
improvement of health, education facilities and purchasing 
power of the people through the economic development of 
developing countries. All of the countries which have GNP 
more than $1000 score higher on Human Development Index, more 
than 50 (although the countries with GNP's less than $1000, 
show large variation in human development, from 12 to 71). An 
increase in the level of human development along with an 
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increase in economic development is in accord with the 
findings of Stokes and Anderson (1990). But there may be a 
problem with precision of specifying variables since squared 
term of economic development level (which is needed to examine 
a curvilinear relationship,) is not included. 
The positive effect of democracy on the human 
development index should be due to improvement of services 
and a decrease in income inequality with the increase of 
democracy in developing countries. Sri Lanka which has 
enjoyed long established democracy has a high human 
development index of 79, which is comparable to those of 
developed countries, whereas Benin which is simillar to Sri 
Lanka in other factors has a human development index of 22. 
The correlation between democracy and less inequality is 
observed, after controlling for economic development in cross-
national analyses (Weede, 1980). Also this positive effect of 
democracy on human development supports the fact that social 
policies of the democratic governments are generally directed 
at winning the support of the urban working class and 
peasantry (Marga 1979). That is, policies of democratic 
governments can make a significant change in terms of human 
development even after controlling for economic development 
level (UN, 1990). This situation is attributed to the 
existence of equitable distributive policies, more favorable 
labor regulations and more decentralized budget allocations in 
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established democracies such as India, Sri Lanka and Costa 
Rica. Economic structure, measured by the relative size of 
the agriculture sector, adversely affects the human 
development index in the poorest countries although it has no 
effect on economic development after controlling for other 
factors. For example, Sierra Leone which has a larger 
agriculture sector than Zambia, but is similar to Zambia in 
other factors, has a lower human development index (15) than 
that of Zambia (48). The relative size of the agriculture 
sector is a proxy for rurality in a developing country which 
is characterized by lack of education and health services 
resulting in a low level of human development. Another 
important contributing factor to the low level of human 
development in agriculture-dominated poorest developing 
countries is low wages and deprivation of plantation workers 
in a large plantation sector. Lack of Influence of economic 
structure (relative size of agriculture sector) in relatively 
high Income countries might be due to high productivity of 
agriculture which is integrated with the industrial sector in 
some of the high Income countries such as South Korea and 
Taiwan. 
The observed positive effect of ethnic homogeneity on 
human development, even with no effect on economic development 
after controlling for external variables, contradicts 
dependency or world system perspective which states that 
75 
ethnic stratification is a product of world market forces 
(Wallerstein, 1979). But there is an independent effect of 
ethnic homogeneity on human development even after controlling 
for capital penetration and economic structure. For an 
example, Madagascar which is ethnically homogeneous (94) has 
higher human development index (44) than Sudan (25) which has 
ethnic homogeneity score of 27, although both countries are 
similar in other characteristics. This might be due to small 
minority groups in higher ethnically homogeneous countries 
since minority populations normally are low income earners and 
have less access to government services in developing 
countries. This situation is aggravated by the fact that 
government activities are not adequately decentralized in 
ethnically segregated developing countries. 
How are Different Dimensions of Human Development 
Affected by External and Internal Factors? 
The economic structure, measured by relative size of the 
agriculture sector of the economy, is an indicator of rurality 
with a high incidence of poverty, hunger, lack of 
communication and lack of physical infra-struture. Significant 
effects of economic structure on separate human development 
indicators such as infant mortality, life expectancy and 
primary education (table 8) can be mediated by various 
intervening factors. The effect of the economic structure on 
primary education is more profound (beta=.80) than the effects 
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on other indicators. This suggests that education may be an 
intervening variable between economic structure and other 
human development indicators. 
The negative effect of disparity between the industrial 
and agriculture sectors on life expectancy may be due to the 
relative high vulnerability of the rural agricultural 
population (nearly 75%-80% of country population) to the 
unfavorable situations such as droughts, famines and 
epidemics. The lack of relationshp between democracy and 
enrollment in education may be because policies and programs 
of democratic governments concentrate more on health and food 
services rather than on education which is a long term 
investment. Besides, female education is discouraged by 
religious beliefs in some developing countries. 
The association of ethnic homogeneity with life 
expectancy and daily calorie consumption may be attributed to 
less inequality in relation to food and other deliveries in 
ethnically homogeneous societies. The absence of an effect of 
ethnic homogeneity on infant mortality which is a very 
sensitive indicator for health care and nutritional status of 
people calls for further research in this field. 
Separate regressions of human development indicators show 
that foreign capital penetration has a harmful effect only on 
daily calorie consumption, net of other control variables. 
This is contrary to Wimberely (1990) who found that foreign 
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capital penetration has a negatiive effect on infant 
mortality. The absence of a significant effect of capital 
penetration on infant mortality may be due to the use of more 
control variables such as economic structure which can operate 
as an intervening variable between penetration and infant 
mortality. The negative effect of foreign capital penetration 
on daily calorie consumption may be a result of the decline of 
domestic food production in developing countries. This 
supports the findings of Marshal and Schwartz (1984) who 
argued that so long as agricultural modernization in 
developing countries occurs in the context of investment 
dependence, the demand for foreign exchange will reinforce the 
mechanisms that bias the distribution of modernization inputs 
toward agricultural export production (not food production). 
78 
REFERENCES 
Adelman, Erma and Morris, Cynthia 
1973 Economic Growth and Social Eauitv in Developing 
Countries. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Amin, Samir 
1976 Unequal Development. New York; Monthly Review 
Press. 
Bollen, K.A. 
1980 "Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political 
Democracy." American Sociological Review 45:370-
90. 
1983 "World System Position, Dependency, and 
Democracy:The Cross National Evidence." American 
Sociological Review 48:468-79. 
Bollen, K.A. and Jackman W. Robert 
1985 "Political Democracy and the Size Distribution of 
Income." American Sociological Review 50:438-57. 
Bollen, K.A. and Jackman W. Robert 
1989 "Democracy, Stability and Dichotomies^ American 
Sociological Review 54:612-621. 
Bollen, Kenneth A. and Burke Grandjean 
1981 "The Dimension(s) of Democracy: Further Issues 
in the Measurement and Effects of Political 
Democracy." American Sociological Review 46:651-
59. 
Bornschier, Volker and Chase-Dunn, Christoher 
1985. Transnational corporations and underdevelopment. 
Praeger,New York: Praeger scientific. 
Bradshaw, York 
1987. "Urbanization and Underdevelopment: A Global Study 
of Modernization, Urban Bias, and Economic 
Dependency." American Sociological Review 52:224-
239. 
Bullock, Bradley 
1986 "Basic Needs Fulfillment Among Less Developed 
Countries: Social Progress Over Two Decades of 
Economic Growth." Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Vanderbiilt University, Nashville, Tennesse. 
79 
Caldwell, John C. 
1980 "Mass Education as a Determinant of the Timing of 
Fertility Decline." Population and Development 
Review 6:225-55. 
Chase-Dunn, Christopher and Robinson, Richard 
1977 Toward Structural Perspective on the world-system. 
Politics and Socletv 7(4):453-76. 
Cutright, Phillips and Adams Richard 
1984 "Economic Dependency and Fertiility in Asia and 
Latin America, 1960-1980." Comparative Social 
Research 7:111-32. 
Delacroix, Jacques and Charles Ragin 
1981 "Structure Blockage: A Cross-National Study of 
Economic Dependency, State Efficacy, and 
Underevelopment." American Journal of Sociology 
86:1311-47. 
Dos Santos, Theotonio 
1970 "The Structure of Dependence." American Economic 
Review 60(May):231-236. 
Evans, Peter B. and Timberlake, Micheal 
1980 "Dependence, Inequality, and the Growth of the 
Tertiary: A Comparative Analysis of Less Developed 
Countries." American Sociological Review 45:531-
52. 
Frank, Andre Gunder 
1969 Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution? 
New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Freire, Paulo 
1973 Education for Critical Consciousness. New York: 
Seabury Press. 
Firebaugh, Glenn 
1980 "The case of the Missing Values Card, and Other 
Mysteries: Another Look at the Effect of Government 
Spending on Income Inequality," American 
Sociological Review 45:137-146. 
George, Susan 
1977 . How the Other Half Dies; The Real Reason for World 
Hunger. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenheld. 
80 
Griffin, Keith 
1977 "Book Review-Why Poor People Stay Poor: A Study of 
Urban Bias in World Development by Michael Lipton." 
Journal of Development Studies 14(1):108-11. 
Hall, Anthony and Midgley, James 
1988 Development Policies: Sociological Perspectives. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Hewitt, Christopher 
1977 "The Effect of Political Democracy and Social 
Democracy on Equality in Industrial Societies: A 
Cross-National Comparison." American Sociological 
Review 42:450-64. 
Hirshman, Albert 
1958 The Strategv of Economic Development. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Hout, Michael 
1980 "Trade Dependence and Fertility in Hispanic America: 
1900-1975." Chapter 8 in Studies of the Modern 
World Svstem edited by A. Bergesen. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Hraba, Joseph 
1979 American Ethnicity. Illinois: Peacock Publishers. 
International Labor Organization. 
1987 Yearbook. Washington,D.C.: International 
Labor Organization. 
Jackman, Robert. 
1975 Politics and Social Eguitv. New York: Wiley. 
Kabaragama, Daisy and Mulford, Charles 
1987 "The Impact of Economic Dependence and 
Overurbanization on Third World Development". 
International Journal of Contemporary Sociology. 
24(1):70-8d. 
Kohli, Atul, Altfeld, F. Lotfian, Saideh and Mardon, Russell 
1984 "In equality in the Third World: An Assessment of 
Competing Explanations" Comparative Political 
Studies 17(3). 
Kuznets,Simon 
1955 "Economic Growth and Income Inequality." American 
Economic Review 45:1-28. 
81 
Lattre, De Anne 
1991 "Democracy in West Africa." Development 3(4):46-48. 
Lenski, Gerhard and Nolan, Paul 
1984 "Trafectories of Development: A Test of Ecological-
Evolutionary Theory." Social Forces 63:1-23. 
Lipton, Michael 
1977 Why Poor People Stav Poor: A Studv of Urban Bias in 
World Development. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
London, Bruce 
1988 "Dependence, Distorte Development, and Fertility 
Trends in Noncore Nations: A structural Analysis of 
Cross-National Data." American Sociological Review 
53:606-18. 
London, Bruce and William, Bruce 
1988 "Multinational Corporate Penetration,Protest, and 
Basic Needs in Non-Core Countries: a Cross National 
Analysis." Social Forces 66:747-73. 
London, Bruce and Robinson, Thomas 
1989 "The effect of International Dependence on Income 
Inequality and Political Violence." American 
Sociological Review. 54:305-309. 
Marga Institute 
1974 Welfare and Growth in Sri Lanka. Clombo: Swasthika 
Press. 
Marshal, Harvey and Schwartz, Micheal 
1984 "Investment Dependency and the Agrarian crisis". 
International Journal of Conttemporarv Sociology. 
24(1):81-92. 
Moran, Theodore 
1978 "Multinational Corporations and Dependency: A 
Dialogue for Dependentistas and Non-
Dependentistas." International Organization 32:79-
100. 
Muller, Edward N. 
1988 "Democracy, Economic Development, and Income 
Inequality." American Sociological Review 53:50-68. 
Nolan, Paul and White R.B 
1983 "Demograghic Differentials in the World System." 
Social Forces 62:1-8. 
82 
Paukert, Felix 
1973 "Income Distribution of Different Levels of 
Development." International Labor Review 108:97-
125. 
Peacock, Walter and Hoover, Greg 
1988 "Divergence and Convergence in International 
Development: A Decomposition Analysis of Inequality 
in the World System" American Sociological Review 
53:838-852 
Potter, J.E 
1983 "Effects of Societal and Community Institutions on 
Fertility" in Determinants of fertilitv in 
developing countries, edited by R.Bulatao and R.Lee, 
New York: Academic Press. 
Rubinson, Richard 
1976 "The World-economy and the Distribution of Income 
Within States: A Cross-national Study." American 
Sociological Review 41:638-59. 
Sell, Ralph R. and Stephen J. Kunitz 
1987 "The Debt Crisis and the End of an Era in Mortality 
Decline." Studies in Compatatlve International 
Development 21:3-30. 
Shin, E. 
1975 "economic and Social Correlates of Infant Mortality: 
A Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Analysis of 63 
Countries." Social Biologv 22: 315-25. 
Sobel, M.E 
1987 "Direct and indirect effects in linear structural 
equation models." Sociological Methods and Research 
16(1):155-177. 
Sowell, Thomas 
1983 The Economics and Politics of Race. New York: 
William Morrow. 
Stack, Steven 
1978 "Internal Political Organization and athe World 
Economy of Income Inequality." American 
Sociological Review 43:271-72 
Stokes, Randall and Anderson, Andy 
1990 "Disarticulation and Human Welfare in Less Developed 
Countries". American Sociological Review 55:63-
74. 
83 
Todaro, Michael P. 
1981 Economic Development in the Third World. New York: 
Longman. 
Ward, K.B 
1984 Women in the World-svstem: Its impact on status and 
fertilitv. New York: Preager. 
Warnock, John W. 
1987 The Politics of Hunger. Toronto: Methuen. 
Weede, Erich 
1980 "Beyong Misspecification in Sociology Analysis of 
Income Inequality." American Sociological Review 
45:497-501. 
Weede, Erich and Tiefenbach, Horst 
1981 "Some Recent Explanations of Income Inequality: An 
Evaluation and Critique." International Studies 
QuarterIv 25:255-82 and 289-93. 
Weisband, Edward 
1989 Povertv amidst Plentv. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Wimberly, W. Dale 
1990 "Investment Dependence and Alternative Explanations 
of Third World Mortality: A Cross National Study" 
American Sociological Review 55:75-91. 
World Bank 
1988 World Development Report. Balrimore: John Hopkins 
Press. 
84 
Part II. IMPORTANCE OF INTERVENING VARIABLES ON HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. 
85 
INTRODUCTION 
Int9FV9ntion@ ot v^riab^eg 
Development Involves improving the living conditions of 
people in a country. This is also referred to as human 
development. Hence, development is not only the increase in 
national income or production, measured by the GNP of a 
country, but it also involves fair distribution as revealed by 
the first part of this study. It is useful to examine the 
process of human development in order to gain insight into the 
mechanisms involved. 
Hence, in this part of the study, I intend to discuss 
possible intervening variables between independent variables 
(internal and external factors) and human development in 
developing countries, identified in the Part I. In addition 
to the variables used in Part I, a few more variables will be 
examined as intervening or mediating variables of the possible 
mechanisms. These variables include income inequality, 
fertility, availability of health services, availability of 
drinking water and use of contraception in developing 
countries. 
Some of the variables, which were used as output variables 
in part 1 of this study (GNP, Per capita calorie consumption, 
and literacy) will also be examined as possible intervening 
variables between internal and external factors and level of 
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human development. Some clues for such intervening roles were 
taken from the regression results in Part 1. 
The level of economic development (GNP) of a country will 
also be considered as a moderating variable for some of the 
possible examples. Hence, models with intervening variables 
will be tested for two groups of countries (GNP < $500 and GNP 
> $500) in order to identify possible interaction effects 
between the level of economic development and the intervening 
variable or the independent variable of the model (Figure 5). 
Intervening variables 
Income Ineoualitv 
Another aspect of economic development in a country is 
income distribution. Two countries with the same level of per 
capita income may have different income distribution patterns. 
Hence, they may have different production and consumption 
structures. For a given low level of GNP and per capita 
income, the more unequal the distribution of income, the more 
aggregate demand and production will be influenced by the 
consumption preferences of the rich (Todaro, 1985). The rich 
can dominate the structure of production and imports toward 
luxury goods despite the basic needs of the poor. A large 
part of a country's resources are used to fulfill the demands 
of a small minority of elites in most developing countries. 
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If the Income Is evenly distributed, the demand would be more 
towards basic food and necessities which would create more 
labor intensive economic activities, benefiting a majority of 
the people. 
However, classical economic theorists argue that income 
inequality of a country has an U shape relationship with the 
level of economic development of a country. Several studies 
on income Inequality, supporting this argument, demonstrate a 
moderately curvilinear relationship between economic 
development and inequality (Weede, 1980). On the other hand, 
several studies, supporting a dependency argument, show that 
foreign capital penetration in a country widens the income 
inequalities within the population by altering certain 
structural conditions and impeding economic growth. 
Multinational firms locate in peripheral nations in order to 
take advantage of the lower wages in these nations. 
Nevertheless, the wages paid by transnational corporations are 
still well above the going rate in peripheral countries. This 
results in a large income gap between those citizens who are 
employed by transnational firms and those who are not. 
Furthermore, the "comprador class" has no incentive to 
initiate redistributive government policies (Bornscheir and 
Chase-Dunn, 1985). 
Hence, income inequality of a country can be examined as 
an intervening variable between capital penetration and 
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economic and human development indicators in order to test the 
above views. 
FsrtilitY 
Most of the developing countries are characterized by 
high fertility rates. Most classical economists contend a 
high rate of population growth is the main cause for the 
underdevelopment of these countries, while proponents of a 
dependency perspective argue that a high rate of population 
growth is a result of under-development itself. I will 
examine fertility as an intervening variable between external 
and internal factors (as in part 1) and development indicators 
in order to test the above propositions. Dependency theorists 
argue that high rates of fertility in developing countries are 
a result of distorted development by economic dependency 
(Nolan and White, 1983). High rates of fertility in these 
distorted economies are caused by slow economic growth, income 
inequality and expansion of the tertiary sector (Bornshier and 
Chase-Dunn, 1985). 
Fertility of a woman is determined by her economic and 
social status. Children are considered as benefits to a 
household when child labor is used for the household economy. 
However, they would be seen as costs toward the household in 
terms of opportunity costs and direct costs to the parents 
even when they are a part of the household economy (Potter, 
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1983). These perceived costs and benefits of the children by 
the parents vary with the mode of production, the mother's 
economic activities, expectations for security In old age and 
Intergeneratlonal wealth flow. 
According to the "wealth flow" theory. In pretransltlon 
societies (before a decline In fertility) the net value of 
Intergeneratlonal wealth flows were upward, whereas In post-
transition societies (after fertility levels have started to 
decline) It Is downward. It Is this change In the direction 
of Inter-generatlonal wealth flows which Is responsible for 
shifts In the balance of children's contributions and costs 
and finally resulting In the onset of fertility decline 
(Caldwell, 1983). 
Women's status In marriage, access to land and women's 
political status are associated with their fertility 
expectations. In addition, religious values, ethnic attitudes 
and community structure influence fertility rates in a 
country. 
Government services 
I intend to Investigate the availability of some basic 
services provided by the governments as intervening variables 
which could mediate between external and internal factors 
(discussed in Part 1) and human development indicators of 
developing countries. Services such as education, health and 
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drinking water along with availability of food are 
fulfillments of basic needs which could be attributed to human 
development of a nation. Income and wealth can be 
redistributed among the people through the provision of these 
services although income inequalities exist in terms of wages 
and pricing policies in a country. 
Especially in developing countries, where absolute 
poverty is very high, provision of these services can be very 
critical determinants of human development indicators such as 
life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy, regardless of 
level of economic development. Empirical evidence shows that 
provision of these services depends on the type of government 
of a country. The type of government is a reflection of 
political awareness and experience of the people. This 
proposition can be reduced to the issue of whether governments 
can represent the voice of a majority of people by fulfilling 
their basic needs despite the existing class structure or 
whether it only serves an elite minority. 
Availability of health services 
Access to health services is a basic need of any group of 
people. But, in many developing countries health services are 
not keeping pace with the changing population. Provision of 
extensive health services by the government is an effective 
distributive strategy implemented by some developing countries 
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which have shown commendable achievement in human development. 
Since most of the primary health care programs in developing 
countries commenced in 1980's, only measures of curative care 
facilities can be considered in this analysis. 
Access to safe drinking water 
Most of the diseases and illnesses in developing 
countries are infectious and parasitic which are water born. 
These diseases can largely be preventable by promoting access 
to safe drinking water. Most of the rural people in developing 
countries consume water which is far below WHO standards in 
terms of the concentration of micro-organisms and in harmful 
minerals such as flourides. 
Besides, supply of domestic water for households is a 
responsibility of women who often have to walk a number of 
miles for water, consuming their productive time. Urban 
biased government policies neglect the drinking water problem 
for the majority of rural people. However, some governments 
in developing countries have diverted substantial resources 
with the assistance of international organizations to rural 
areas for drinking water supplies through small schemes, tube 
wells and protected dug wells. 
Making access to safe drinking water for rural people is 
an effective distributive strategy of governments which 
contribute to human development for the majority of people. 
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Family planning programs 
Family planning activities in a country could have an 
impact on population growth and on human development 
indicators such as infant mortality and life expectancy of 
women. The success of these activities are closely associated 
with the religious beliefs, type of government and educational 
level of the people. Some democratic governments in 
developing countries have heavily subsidized family planning 
services. Hence, use of family planning services is worth 
examining as an intervening variable between internal factors 
such as democracy and fertility. Such an examination would 
allow us to have insight into the effects of government 
programs and government blessed voluntary participatory 
programs on development of a country. 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses from the literature and from the 
findings of Part I will be tested in this second part of this 
study. 
1. There is a significant negative indirect effect of 
the economic structure on human development through 
economic development. 
2. There is a significant positive indirect effect of 
democracy on human development through economic 
development. 
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3. There is a significant negative indirect effect of 
foreign capital penetration on human development through 
economic structure. 
4. There is a significant negative indirect effect of 
the economic structure on human development through food 
availability. 
5. There is a significant negative indirect effect of 
economic structure on human development through primary 
education. 
6. There is a significant positive indirect effect of 
democracy on human development through availability of 
health services. 
7. There is a significant positive indirect effect of 
democracy on human development through availability of 
drinking water. 
8. There is a significant negative indirect effect of 
economic structure on human development through 
fertility. 
9. There is a significant positive indirect effect of 
democracy on human development through fertility. 
10. There is a significant positive indirect effect of 
ethnic homogeneity on human development through 
fertility. 
11. There is a significant negative indirect effect of 
capital penetration on human development through income 
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inequality. 
12. There is a significant positive indirect effect of 
democracy on human development through income inequality. 
In addition to testing indirect effects through 
intervening variables, possible simultaneous direct effects of 
exogenous variables to the endogenous variable will also be 
examined. 
Possible moderating effects (interactions) of the level 
of economic development of a country with the economic 
structure, democracy, fertility, and capital penetration on 
different output variables in the models will be tested. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Measures 
Income inequality 
Income inequality in a nation is commonly measured by the 
Gini coefficient of concentration. The Gini coefficient is an 
indicator of the extent to which the distribution of income 
deviates from perfect equality. The Gini coefficient can be 
obtained by plotting the cumulative percentage of population 
and the respective cumulative percentage of total income 
(Lorenz curve). The degree of inequality in income 
distribution is shown by how far the Lorenz curve departs from 
the diagonal. The proportion of total area below the diagonal 
that is above the Lorenz curve is the Gini coefficient. 
Gini coefficients (Muller, 1988) calculated using the 
data from World Bank, ILO and United Nations organizations 
for the period of 1965-1975 are used for the analyses. 
Fertility 
The fertility rate (total fertility rate) is measured by 
the number of children that would be born to a woman, if she 
were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear 
children at each age in accordance with prevailing age-
specific fertility rates. Data are derived from the World 
Fertility Survey. 
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AvsilabilitY of health services 
As government health programs and institutions are run by 
physicians, the average number of people covered by one 
physician is a good indicator of availability of health 
services in a country. 
Familv Planning programs 
Intensity of family planning programs can be measured by 
the percentage of married women of childbearing age (15-44 
yrs) using contraception. This refers to women who are 
practicing or whose husbands are practicing any form of 
contraception. These include condoms, diaphrams, spermicides, 
intrauterine devices, oral and injectable contraceptives, 
sterilization, withdrawal and abstinence. Data are from World 
Bank Annual Reports for 1986 which have been based on the 
World Fertility Survey. 
Availibilitv of safe drinking water 
The availability of safe drinking water can be measured 
by the percentage of population in a country who have access 
to safe drinking water. These figures were taken from the 
United Nations (UNCD) for 1990. 
Measurements of primary education and availability of 
food (per capita calorie consumption) were described in Part 
I. 
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Only one dimension of human development, expected years 
of living, which is measured by life expectancy is considered 
as the output variable for this part of the study. Expected 
length of life is the most sensitive human development 
indicator (dimension) to internal and external factors when 
compared with infant mortality, per capita calorie 
consumption, and literacy as revealed by Part I. Moreover, 
life expectancy can be considered as product of other human 
development measures in a country. 
Anslyses 
Separate path models for different hypotheses will be 
tested using Lisrel Program. This program is used because it 
shows the significance of indirect effects in the models. 
Also, different models can easily be compared for their 
explanatory ability, by comparing the chi-square values of 
those models. 
Figure 4 shows two nested sample models that have to be 
tested in order to study the mechanisms of effects. Model B 
is the reduced model. The coefficients of the paths are a, b 
and c. Then the indirect effect from X to Y2 in model A would 
be a*b. Lisrel provides the t value needed to test the 
significance of all the effects (coefficients) of models 
including indirect effect a*b, according to Sobel's (1987) 
method . 
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a b 
> Y1 > 
I I 
Model A X >Y2 
Y1 
Model B X Y2 
Figure 4. Two Sample models to be tested for different 
hypotheses 
If the corresponding t value is more than 2.0, any effect 
is significant at the .05 level. Model A can be compared with 
Model B for their overall fitness. If the change in Chi-
sguare from model A to Model B is more than 3.84 (equal to 
square of Z value), Model A is the better fitting mechanism 
than Model B at .05 significance level. If the change in Chi-
square is less than 3.84, Model B is the better fitting 
mechanism than Model A at .05 significance level. 
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al bl a2 
-> Y1 
b2 
r Y1 
X > Y2 X > Y2 
Cl c2 
Model C: Group 1 (GNP < $500) Model D: Group 2 (GNP >$500) 
Figure 5. Identical models for group comparison, testing 
If there is no moderating effect from a fourth variable 
on any of three effects in the models then al=a2, bl=b2, and 
cl=c2. However, there can be variables (eg.GNP) which may 
have moderating effects on the relationshp between any two 
variables (e.g., X and Y1 in Model A). This is called an 
interaction between P and X on Yl, and there is a significant 
difference between al and a2. That is, the magnitude of the 
effect (al or a2) depends on the value of the GNP 
corresponding to X and Yl (Figure 5). This type of 
interaction can also occur between P and X on Y2, or GNP and 
Yl on Y2. The significance of an interaction effect can be 
interactions 
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tested using Lisrel. Models C and D are for two separate 
groups of countries: countries with GNP less than $500 and 
countries with GNP more than $500. In order to test any 
interaction between GNP and X on Yl, two models are compared 
using Chi-sguare values by: a) Fixing all the corresponding 
paths to be invariant; and b) After freeing only necessary 
corresponding paths of the two models (paths between X and Y1 
in two models). If the difference in Chl-square for two model 
comparisons is more than 3.84, the difference in the 
coefficients of tested paths of two models is significant at 
.05 significant level. That is, there is an interaction of GNP 
on the association between X and Yl. Any interaction of GNP 
in relation to other paths can be tested in similar manner. 
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RESULTS 
The results of testing of hypotheses 1 through 12 using 
Lisrel are discussed in order to gain insight into the 
possible paths from between internal or external factors to 
human development through different intervening variables. It 
is not Intended to test and Identify a comprehensive model 
including all of the concerned variables, but to use the 
findings of separate simplified models (without controlling 
for other variables) to Identify the possible intervening 
variables between internal and external factors and human 
development. 
Economic Development as an Intervening Variable 
Effect of economic structure on human development 
through economic development 
In this section, the test of hypothesis 1 predicting that 
there is a significant negative effect of economic structure 
on life expectancy through economic development, is reported. 
Model lA and model IB (Figure 6) include the level of 
economic development (GNP) as the intervening variable between 
economic structure and life expectancy. Model lA shows a 
direct effect of economic structure on life expectancy 
whereas Model IB is the corresponding reduced model. Both the 
direct effect (t=-3.36, p<.05) and indirect effect (t=-4.10. 
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p<.01) are significant. Hypothesis 1 is supported by the data. 
Hence the economic structure negatively affect life expectancy 
by impeding economic development. In addition, the economic 
structure has a direct negative effect on life expectancy. 
Model lA is a better fitting model (difference in Chi-square,l 
d.f = 10.42, p=00) than model IB. 
Effect of Democracy on Human Development through Economic 
Development 
In this section, hypothesis 2 predicting there is a 
significant positive effect of democratic experience on life 
expectancy through economic development, is tested. Model 2A 
and Model 2B (Figure 6) use democratic experience as an 
exogenous variable in place of economic structure and life 
expectancy as an endogenous variable. These models show 
similar results as in four earlier models, having both 
significant direct (t=4.28, p<.01) and indirect (t=2.01, 
p<.05) significant effects. Hypothesis 2 is accepted. Hence, 
the democracy positively effect life expectancy by improving 
GNP. In addition, there is a positive direct effect of 
democracy on life expectancy. Change in Chi-sguare for 1 d.f 
(14.88) in two models shows that Model 2A is better fitting. 
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Figure 6. Models with GNP as intervening variable 
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Effect of capital penetration on human development through 
economic development 
Hypothesis 3 predicted capital penetration will have a 
significant negative effect on life expectancy through 
economic development (Figure 6). Although, human development 
indicators were regressed on internal and external factors, as 
an output variable (as in the case of level of economic 
development) in Part I, it is interesting to examine whether 
these factors affect human development through present level 
of economic development. 
Model 3A and Model 3B (Figure 6) include level of 
economic development as the intervening variable between 
foreign capital penetration and life expectancy. Model 3A has 
both direct and indirect effects of capital penetration on 
life expectancy whereas Model 3B, a nested reduced model, has 
only the indirect effect of capital penetration on life 
expectancy through present level of economic development. 
Results show that only the indirect effect (t=2.77, p<.05) is 
significant. Model 3B is better fitting (difference in Chl-
sguare for the two models for 1 d.f.=.44,p=.51). Hypothesis 3 
is supported by the data. 
Services and Subsidies as Intervening Variables 
Effect of economic structure on human development through 
availability of food 
In this section, hypothesis 4 predicting there Is a 
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significant negative Indirect effect of economic structure on 
life expectancy through food availability Is reported. 
Model 4A and Model 4B (Figure 7) Include level of per 
capita calorie consumption as the Intervening variable between 
economic structure and life expectancy. Model 4A has both 
direct and Indirect effects of economic structure on life 
expectancy, whereas Model 4B Is the corresponding reduced 
model. Results show that both the direct effect (t=-5.62, 
p<.01) and Indirect effect (t=-3.84, p<.01) are significant. 
Hypothesis 4 is supported by the data. Hence economic 
structure negatively effect life expectancy by decreasing the 
food availability. In addition, there is a direct negative 
effect of the economic structure on life expectancy. Model 4A 
is better fitting (difference In Chi-square, for 1 
d.f.=22.66). 
Effect of economic structure through primary education 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that there will be a negative 
indirect effect of economic structure on life expectancy 
through primary education. 
Model 5A and Model 5B include enrollment in primary 
education as the intervening variable between economic 
structure and life expectancy. Model SA has both direct and 
indirect effects of economic structure on life expectancy, 
whereas model 53 is the corresponding reduced model. Results 
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Figure 7. Models with food consumption and education 
enrollment as intervening variables 
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show that both direct effect and Indirect effect are 
significant (t=4.20,3.14 respectively). Hypothesis 5 Is 
accepted. Hence economic structure negatively affects life 
expectancy by lowering the level of primary education. In 
addition, there is a direct negative effect of economic 
structure on life expectancy. Model 1 is better fitting 
(difference in Chi-square, for 1 d.f.=16.98). 
The effect of available services 
In this section, hypotheses 6 and 7 predicting that there 
are significant positive effects of democracy on life 
expectancy through public services such as health and drinking 
water are tested. 
Roles of government services such as health and drinking 
water are examined as intervening variables in Models 6A to 
Model 7B (Figure 8). Model 6A and Model 7A show that there are 
significant Indirect effects (t= 2.57,2.43, p<.05) of 
democracy on life expectancy, through provision of health 
services and establlshilng access to driinking water. 
Hypothesis 6 and 7 are supported by data. Hence, 
democracy positively affect life expectancy by improving the 
availability of services such as health services and drinking 
water. In addition, the democracy has a significant direct 
effect on life expectancy. Model 6A and Model 7A which 
108 
.89 .89 
> Health Serv—>— 
* * 
-.33 -.54 
Democracy 
.49 
.31 
->Life 
Expect 
> Health Serv—> 
.33 
Democracy 
—. 65 
58 
<-
Life 
Expect 
Chi-square = 0 
Model 6A 
Chi-square = 10.36 (1 d.f) 
Model 6B 
.89 .89 
> D.Water — , 
* * 
.33 .59 
Democracy 
.44 
Life<— 
->Expect 
.29* 
Chi-square = 0 
Model 7A 
t—> D.Water ->— 
* 
.33 .69 
.52 
Life < 
Democracy Expect 
Chi-square =9.19 (1 d.f) 
Model 7B 
Figure 8. Models with health services and access to 
drinking water as intervening variables 
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include direct effects, are better fitting than model 6B and 
model 7B respectively (changes in Chi-sguare are 10.36 and 
6.85 for 1 d.f.). 
Is democracy a product of External Factors? 
It is important to examine whether type of government 
(democratic experience) is a product of external factors such 
as foreign capital penetration and economic structure 
(externally controlled structural condition) or whether the 
government is an organization with an autonomous character. 
Democratic experience was used as an intervening variable 
between capital penetration and level of economic development, 
and economic structure and level of economic development 
respectively. Results show that indirect effects in both 
models are non-significant (t=00,-1.00, p>.10). Hence, the 
dependency view that type of government (democratic experience 
of the people) is merely a product of external factors, is not 
supported by the data. 
Fertility as an intervening variable 
Models 8A to lOB (Figure 9) examine the role of fertility 
as an intervening variable between some external and internal 
factors and human development indicators. 
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Effect of economic structure on human development through 
fertility 
In this section, hypothesis 8 that there will be a 
significant negative indirect effect on life expectancy 
through fertility is suppported. Model 8A and model SB 
include fertility as an intervening variable between economic 
structure and life expectancy. Model SA has both direct and 
indirect effects of economic structure on life expectancy. 
Results show that both the direct effect (t=-5.71, p<.01) and 
indirect effect (t=-4.00, p<.01) are significant. Hypothesis 8 
is accepted. Hence economic structure negatively affects life 
expectancy by impeding the fertility decline. In addition, 
there is a negative direct effect of economic structure on 
life expectancy. Model 8A is better fitting (difference in 
Chi-square, for 1 d.f.=18.15). 
Effect of democracy on human development through fertility 
Hypothesis 9 predicted that there is a significant 
positive indirect effect of democracy on life expectancy 
through fertility. Model 9A and model 9B include fertility as 
an intervening variable between democratic experience and life 
expectancy. Model 9A has both direct and indirect effects of 
democracy on life expectancy whereas model 93 is its 
corresponding reduced model. Results show that both the direct 
effect (t=2.50, p<.05) and indirect effect (t=2.85, p<.05) are 
significant. Hypothesis 9 is supported. Model 9A is better 
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Figure 9. Models with fertility as an intervening variable 
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fitting than Model 9B (difference in Chi-square, for 1 
d.f.=4.77). 
Effect of ethnic homogeneity on human development through 
fertilitY 
In this section, the results of the test of hypothesis 10 
predicting that there is a significant positive indirect 
effect of ethnic homogeneity through fertility, are reported. 
Model lOA and model lOB include fertility as an 
intervening variable between ethnic homogeneity and life 
expectancy. Model lOA has both direct and indirect effects of 
ethnic homogeneity on infant mortality whereas model 103 is 
its corresponding reduced model. Results show that only the 
indirect effect (t=2.55, p<.05) is significant. Hypothesis 10 
is accepted. Hence, ethnic homogeneity positively affect life 
expectancy by decreasing fertilty rates. In addition to this 
indirect effect, there is no direct effect of ethnic 
homogeneity on life expectancy. Model 103 is better fitting 
(difference in Chi-square, 1 d.f.=l.S8, p=.21). 
Effect of income ineoualitv on human development 
Hypothesis 11 predicted that there is a significant 
negative indirect effect of capital penetration on life 
expectancy through income inequality. Model llA and model 
113 (Figure 10) which use income inequality as intervening 
variable between capital penetration and life expectancy show 
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that the indirect effect through income inequality is not 
significant (t=1.30, p>.10) although there is a highly 
significant positive effect of capital penetration on income 
inequality. Hence, hypothesis 11 is not supported by the data 
and is rejected. 
The results of the test of hypothesis 12 which predicted 
there is a significant positive indirect effect of democratic 
experience on life expectancy through income inequality, are 
reported. 
Model 12A and model 12B (Figure 9) which use income 
inequality as an intervening variable between democratic 
experience and life expectancy show that the indirect effect 
through income inequality is not significant (t=1.00, p>.10). 
However, there is a highly significant positive direct effect 
of democratic experience on life expectancy. Hence, hypothesis 
12 is not supported by the data and is rejected. 
Interaction effects of level of economic development 
In this section, observed interaction effects are 
reported. Interaction effects of level of economic development 
of a country (GNP) were tested for all the models which do not 
contain GNP as an intervening variable. The following 
significant interaction effects were observed. 
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Interaction between GNP with primary education on life 
expççtanPY 
Two models corresponding to two groups of countries (GNP 
< $500 and GNP > $500) were considered (Figure 5). These two 
models were compared: a) After fixing all the corresponding 
paths are invaraint; and b) After freeing the necessary path 
that has to be compared for Interaction. The difference in 
Chi-sguare for the two model comparisons (two models with all 
three invariant paths, and two models with freed relevant 
path) for the two groups of countries is 3.12 for 1 d.f. 
There is a significant difference (p<.10) in the coefficients 
of the corresponding paths of the two models (.63,.31) 
including economic structure (X), primary education (Yl) and 
life expectancy (Y2) when the necessary path is freed in both 
models. Hence, the effect of primary education on life 
expectancy is significant in poorer countries whereas there is 
no such effect in remaining countries. 
Interaction between GNP and economic structure on 
fertility 
The difference in Chi-square for the two model 
comparisons (including economic structure (X), fertility (Yl) 
and life expectancy (Y2)) for the two groups of countries is 
3.86 for 1 d.f. There is a significant difference in the 
coefficients of the corresponding path (between economic 
structure and fertility) of the two models (.17,.47) when it 
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Is freed in both models. Hence, the effect of economic 
structure on fertility is significant in relatively 
economically developed countries whereas this effect is not 
significant in poorer countries. 
Interaction between GNP and democracy on Income 
inegvality. 
The difference in Chi-sguare for the two model (including 
democracy (X), income ineguality (Yl) and life expectancy 
(Y2)) comparisons for the two groups of countries is 10.00 for 
1 d.f. There is a significant difference in the coefficients 
of the corresponding path (democracy and income ineguality) of 
the two models (-.72,-.06) when that path is freed in both 
models. Hence, the effect of democracy on income ineguality is 
significant only on poorer countries. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results show that foreign capital penetration has a 
harmful effect on human development indicators (see part 1) by 
impeding economic development in developing countries, 
supporting dependency perspective (Lenskl and Nolan, 1984; 
Nolan and White, 1983; Sell and Kunitz, 1987). Ethiopia, 
Zaire, Togo, and Sierra Leone are good examples of countries 
which have high capital penetrations (more than 60), very low 
6NP (less than $300) and very low life expectancy (less than 
53 years). This is contrary to modernization theorists, who 
argue that there is a beneficial effect of capital penetration 
on human welfare (Sowell, 1983). However, this significant 
link between the level of economic development and human 
development supports findings of Stokes and Anderson (1990). 
Accordingly, a higher level of economic development may 
contribute to human development through an Increase of 
capability of providing basic services to the people, better 
physical infra-structure, communication and media. This is a 
type of "trickle down effect" from higher strata towards lower 
strata which support the arguments of modernization theorists. 
There is no direct Independent effect of capital 
penetration on life expectancy, when other factors are not 
controlled except for economic development. This finding is in 
in conflict with some dependency proponents who argue that 
there are harmful effects of foreign capital penetration 
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through widening income inequalities. Widening income 
inequalities in turn result in lower human development. 
There is no significant link between Income inequality 
and human development (life expectancy). Although, Zambia and 
Sudan have the same level of income inequality; Gini 
coefficients are 42 and 41, respectively) they show 
significantly different life expectancies (53 and 41 
respectively) and human development scores (48 and 25 
respectively). This is contrary to the views of some of the 
dependency theorists that inequality created by dependency has 
harmful effects on human welfare. 
Thus there can be a respectable level of human 
development in a country regardless of income inequality. 
This may be due to the noncash income of 'low income earners' 
through subsistence agriculture and also to distributive 
policies of governments which channel a substantial portion of 
resources for the provision of basic services. 
The results show that economic structure (which was 
measured by percentage of agriculture in a country) limits 
human development by impeding economic development (Lipton, 
1977; Peacock, 1988; Stokes, 1990;) when other variables are 
not controlled because there seems to be a significant link 
between economic development and human development. All of 
the poorest countries (GNP less than $350) have nearly 50 
percent or more in agriculture production and show less than 
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53 years of life expectancy. However, economic structure, 
which is a proxy for rurality of a country, also has an 
independent direct negative effect on human development 
indicators regardless of level of economic development when 
the other factors are not controlled. 
Although Nigeria has a GNP ($640) four times higher than 
Bangladesh ($160), both countries, which have 53 percent in 
agriculture production, have similar life expectancies of 51 
years and 47 years and comparable human development scores, 27 
and 31, respectively. This direct effect of economic 
structure may be attributed to the deprivation of rural 
agricultural areas in terms of government services, infra­
structure and low social status of the people regardless of 
the economic development of the country as a whole. 
Democratic experience of people in a country has a 
beneficial effect on economic development (as discussed in 
part 1) which could contribute to human development (Muller, 
1988; Freire, 1973). Most of the countries with established 
democracies show higher GNPs and higher life expectancy. 
Established democracies such as Paraguay, Costa Rica, Uruguay, 
Venezuela and Israel have GNPs of more than $1000 and show 
life expectancies more than 70 years. 
However, in addition, there is a direct beneficial effect 
of democratic experience on human development regardless of 
level of economic development. Although Sri Lanka has a low 
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GNP ($390) its people have a life .expectancy of 70 years. 
This may be due to the autonomous distributive policies 
carried out by democratic governments regardless of level of 
economic development (Goulet, 1989, Marga, 1979). This is 
contrary to the dependency perspective which states that 
governments are not autonomous but a product of external 
forces (Kohl, 1984). 
Although, the indirect effect of democracy on life 
expectancy through income inequality is not significant, there 
is a significant effect of democracy on income inequality. 
This effect is moderated by the level of economic development 
of a country. In poorest countries, the beneficial effect of 
democracy on income inequality is more prominent (established 
democracies such as India and Sri Lanka show lowest Gini 
coefficients of 34 and 38 respectively). However, in 
relatively economically more developed countries this effect 
is not significant (relatively high income countries with 
established democracies such as Mexico and Brazil show 
relatively high Gini coefficients of 52 and 56). This 
indicates that democratic policies are more effective in the 
poorest group of countries in terms of income equality. This 
may be due to the lack of established capitalist class in 
poorest countries. The results of the models with public 
services and facilities as intervening variables call for more 
research on the issue that democracy of a country benefits 
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human development not only by contributing to economic 
development but also by promoting distributive policies 
through provision of needed basic services for human 
development (Marga, 1979; Goulet, 1989). Costa Rica which has 
long enjoyed democracy spends 33% of its national income for 
health services and has achieved a life expectancy of 70 years 
whereas Sudan which had authoritarian type government spends 
only 1% of national income for health services and has a life 
expectancy of 50 years. All the established democracies among 
the developing countries which show relatively high level of 
human development, have a substantial percentage of population 
with access to safe drinking water: Costa Rica 91%, Paraguay 
78%, and Malaysia 80%. However, provision of safe drinking 
water is severely affected by the agro-ecological condition of 
a country. 
The results of the models with democracy as an 
intervening variable support the argument of some development 
activists that governments are not merely a product of 
external factors, but they have some kind of autonomous 
character regardless of external and structural factors 
(Weede, 1980). 
Daily per capita calorie consumption is determined not 
only by economic development but also by the production of 
food. The indirect negative effect of economic structure on 
human development indicators through per capita calorie 
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consumption may be attributed to the decline of domestic food 
production In developing countries. This result supports the 
argument of dependency theorists that developing countries 
have to emphasize capital accumulation and foreign exchange 
earnings Instead of Increase the productivity of domestic 
agriculture because of Its dependent economic structure 
(Marshal and Schwartz, 1984). 
Economic structure, which reflects the rurallty of a 
country, affects primary education. Especially, agriculture 
dominant economic structures of developing countries compel 
rural landless population to hire their labor to commercial 
plantations which discourage them from school enrollment. 
Rural families trade off children's education In favor of 
dally cash earnings by hiring labor. Most of the time, girls 
have to look after their younger siblings are and prepare 
meals because both parents and elder siblings are Involved In 
wage labor. Also, high rural-urban disparity of services In 
agriculture-dominant countries deprive the rural population of 
education. The countries which have very large agricultural 
sectors such as sub-Saharan countries show a very low 
percentage of national expenditure (less than 10 percent) for 
education. Moreover, a large portion of this meager 
allocation Is absorbed by the urban sector, leaving the rural 
population untouched and Illiterate. 
The interaction effect of level of economic development 
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and primary education on life expectancy Is Interesting. This 
Interaction Indicates that primary education Is more effective 
In Increasing the living condition of the people In poorest 
countries. This may be because most of the diseases, 
Illnesses and poor health of rural population can be 
eradicated by preventive health practices and better 
nutrition. These practices are more apparent among literate 
people as they are more knowledgeble . Moreover, literate 
people are better receivers of technological messages, 
extension and other services. They are more politically 
active and have more bargaining power for their wages and for 
prices of their products. But in relatively economically 
developed countries, people have already passed this stage. 
The results of the models with fertility as an 
intervening variable show that economic structure of 
developing countries (relative size of agricultural sector) 
affect human development adversely, by impeding a decline in 
fertility (Ward, 1984; Hout, 1980). This result is 
contradictory to the view of some modernization theorists that 
there is no association between fertility decline and 
dependency Indicators (Curtrlght and Adams, 1984). The 
association between economic structure and fertility may be 
attributed to the favorable evaluation of adding more children 
to the family by the parents, to have more child labor and 
increase security in their old age in a rural agricultural 
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environment (Potter, 1983). In addition, high fertility rates 
in developing countries may also be attributed to illiteracy 
and low levels of education of women. Model 13 shows that an 
indirect effect of economic structure on fertility through 
primary school education of women is significant (t=3.44). 
Fertility affects infant mortality and life expectancy by 
worsening the food and water situation in the family, 
providing less attention to care of children and of elderly, 
and decreases family hygiene. 
The interaction effect of level of economic development 
with economic structure on fertility indicates that the effect 
of economic structure on fertility does not operate in the 
poorest group of developing countries. All of the developing 
countries with lower GNPs (less than $500) have high fertility 
rates (close to 6), except for Sri Lanka and India. This may 
be due to the fact that all of the poorest countries have 
largely agriculture dominant structures. However, in higher 
income countries there is a decline of fertility rate with the 
decrease of agriculture sector. Among high income developing 
countries, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore show a fertility 
rate of 2 with small agricultural sectors whereas Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Cameroon and Cote De Ivoire show fertility rates of 
7 with relatively large agricultural sectors. This may be due 
to the structural condition created by the economy which 
influences fertility decisions. 
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Also the democratic experience in a country has a 
beneficial effect on fertility decline which would contribute 
to human development. This beneficial effect of democracy on 
fertility in developing countries may be attributed to higher 
literacy rates and more awareness, higher social status of 
women and better family planning activities. Recent studies 
on the use of contraception show that in many countries, 
families struggle to pay for food, and effective modern 
contraceptives are a luxury item. However, most established 
democracies such as Sri Lanka and India have subsidized family 
planning services. There is a significant indirect effect of 
democracy in a country on the use of contraception which 
contributes to a decline in fertility (t=3.44). 
The results indicate that high ethnic homogeneity is 
associated with low fertility which contributes to human 
development. For example, Korea, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and 
Jamaica which are ethnically homogeneous ( ethnic homogeneity 
more than 80) have the lowest fertility, less than 3. This 
may be due to the fact that fertility rates of minorities in 
heterogeneous societies exceed the country averages. This may 
be due to their lower social status and to ethnic interests 
because different ethnic groups may view fertility control 
programs as a genocidal attempt to reduce their influence by 
reducing their numbers (Stockwell and Laidlaw, 1981). 
The above discussion was based on testing of separate 
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models of three variables without controlling for the rest of 
the variables. Hence, it was not possible to investigate 
whether one variable was an artifact of another. Further 
studies are needed to gain insight into a broader 
comprehensive model of the development process in developing 
countries. The following two hypothetical models (Figure 5 
and Figure 6) for the poorest countries (GNP < $500) and 
relatively high income countries (GNP > $500) which can be 
tested in further studies, emerge from the findings of Part I 
and Part II of this research. 
Lagged Economic 
Development Level 
Foreign Investment 
Dependency 
Economic 
Structure 
Ethnic Homogeneity 
Level and period 
of Democracy — 
> Eco. Development —> Human 
Development 
Pri. Edu-
Family -
Planning 
-Ineguality-
> Fertility 
->-
Services & 
-> Facilities 
->-
Food 
-> Consumption 
Figure 5. Hypothetical model for development process in 
developing countries (GNP < $500) for further 
studies 
127 
Lagged Economic 
Development level 
Eco. Development —> Human 
Development 
Economic 
Structure 
Fertility 
Ethnic Homogeneity 
Level and Period 
of Democracy 
Services s 
> Facilities 
Figure 6. Hypothetical model for development process in 
developing countries (GNP > $500) for further 
studies 
These models incorporate both direct and indirect effects 
of internal and external factors on level of development in a 
developing country. Human development is taken as the final 
output of the process whereas economic development is also 
incorporated as an intervening variable. When both the direct 
and indirect effects on human development are examined at the 
same time, a deeper insight on the causal mechanisms of this 
development process can be gained. However, this type of 
more comprehensive analysis would need a larger number of 
countries with necessary data. 
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The model for poorest countries (Figure 5) includes the 
the indirect effects of penetration, economic structure and 
democracy on human develpment through primary education, 
inequality and food consumption whereas the model for the rest 
of the countries (Figure 6) does not include those indirect 
effects. However, the model for higher income countries 
includes the indirect effect of economic structure on human 
development through fertility. Hence, these two models 
incorporate differential effects of internal and external 
factors on human development, depending on the level of 
economic development of a country. 
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SUMMARY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Policy Implications; Theory to Practice 
I intend to discuss the appropriate policies and actions 
that can be taken by the developing nations towards their 
development in light of the findings of this study. The main 
findings of this study can be summarized as follows. 
a) Foreign dependency and structural dependency of the 
poorest developing countries negatively affect economic 
development. 
b) Democratic representative participation of the people, 
although it is a limited form of participation, positively 
contributes to economic development, income equity, fertility 
decline and provision of basic services to the people. 
c) Economic development, provision of basic services and 
fertility decline contribute to human development. 
These observations were based on cross-national data from 
developing countries which have different cultural, religious, 
ethnic and historical backgrounds. However, there is an 
important message, common to all developing countries, 
associated with these observations. It is that the democratic 
participation of people can make a 'change' by direct and 
indirect means. Democratic governments are compelled to take. 
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at least limited, direct welfare measures fulfilling the basic 
needs of the people. Democratic participation of people can 
make access to productive assets for the people and allow them 
to utilize these assets appropriately which result in human 
and economic development. Hence, developing countries, acting 
in this direction, should facilitate and foster the democratic 
participation of the people in the decision making process. 
This democratic participation of the people can be practiced 
not only at the national level but also at lower levels, more 
meaningfully. 
The external factors such as foreign investment 
dependency and structural dependency and internal factors such 
as ethnic heterogeneity of developing countries are difficult 
to change. In this study these factors were taken as 
exogenous. Thus I will not discuss changing these exogenous 
factors as it is beyond the scope of this sociological study. 
However, this study showed that the effects of these factors 
can be minimized, or eliminated or can even be turned to 
benefits by autonomous national policies of democratic 
governments. That is, governments which are responsive to 
welfare of the people can make suitable conditions to minimize 
the effects of external factors. For this task, governments 
should be autonomous and should have a political will and a 
sufficient power base. The democratic participation of the 
people can make governments autonomous, avoiding the 
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domination of an elite class. The autonomous nature and 
responsiveness of the representative governments can be 
enhanced by the awareness, political consciousness, 
organization and the education level of the common people. 
Democratic participation in different countries, varies 
in quality and quantity. Although, the measurement of the 
democratic participation of people was limited to national 
level (representative participation) in this study, it can 
effectively be extended to lower levels: divisional and grass 
roots levels. Democratic participation at every level would 
ensure the participation of the people in making decisions 
concerning their lives. It allows them to release their 
latent energy and skills. "When people are oppressed or 
reduced to the culture of silence, they do not participate in 
their own humanization. Conversely, when they participate, 
thereby becoming active subjects of knowledge and action, they 
begin to construct their properly human history and engage in 
processes of authentic development" (Goulet. 1989:1). Thus, 
they will be the subjects of the development process, not 
merely the objects. That is, the people are mobilized in 
political, economic, and human development. 
The national level policies and reforms (actions from 
"above") should foster the lower level development activities 
(actions from "below"). Lower level micro activities can be 
developed and sustained only in a favorable national level 
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macro policy framework. 
Democratic Participation at National Level 
Democratic participation of the people can form 
democratic governments which are accountable to the people. 
Only the governments which are accountable to the people are 
committed to carry out people-centered policies for economic 
and human development. Moreover, only democratic governments 
have the necessary power base for the implementation of such 
policies. There is a fundamental inconsistency between 
market ideologies and mass mobilization, and between the 
highly secretive conditions of program's negotiation and the 
exercise of democratic participation (Mkandawire, 1991). Most 
of the developing countries have authoritarian regimes which 
do not allow or foster any kind of participatory action of 
its people. Most of these governments are corrupt, less 
unaccountable and prey to rule by privileged elite and 
military powers rather than by men and women's ability 
(Lattre, 1991). 
Some of the effective policies and reforms, that have to 
be formulated at national level in developing countries,(which 
are responsible for the remarkable progress achieved by some 
of the democratic nations, studied) should be addressed the 
need of facilitating democratic participation of the people at 
all the levels. The facilitation of democratic participation 
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in human and economic development includes the direct means 
such as ensuring basic rights and indirect means such as 
eradication of existing disparities and human welfare for 
poorest sections of the society. This type of policy package 
necessarily includes: 
a) Equality of access to economic resources (especially land) 
for all regardless of gender, ethnicity or caste; 
b) Equal political, social and cultural rights for all; 
c) Land reform: Fixing maximum limits for land ownership and 
elimination of landlessness which is the main resource for 
rural people; 
d) Pricing policies which are favorable to rural 
agricultural and food production (Lipton, 1977); 
e) Education for all: Subsidized or free primary education 
(UNCD, 1990); 
f) Health for all: Access to preventive and curative services; 
g) Family planning programs: subsidized or free family 
planning services for all; 
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h) Food: subsidized food for poorest sections of the people 
(UNCD, 1990); 
k) Supply of safe drinking water for all; 
1) Bureaucratic reforms: making bureaucracy more responsive 
to the needs of the people; 
m) Decentralization: delegation of decision making authority 
to lower level participatory organizations and to local 
level officers; and 
n) Institutional building: Institutions should be built in 
order to strengthen the power base of democratic 
governments and to foster democratic participation of the 
people at lower levels. 
The equal political, social, cultural and economic rights 
regardless of gender, ethnicity or caste are the basic pre­
requisites for the democratic participation of people in a 
country. This allows all the people Including women, 
landless, 'untouchables', and unemployed to participate in 
production and to Increase productivity. These basic rights 
would eliminate some of the discrimination and disparities of 
deprived groups in these countries. 
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In relation to the rural agricultural sector, successful 
countries show that most essential pre-requlsltes for the 
participation of people in economic and human development are 
reforms in the land ownership pattern and in the pricing 
policy. The successful implementation of these reforms need a 
strong political will and a strong popular power base. The 
unutilized lands concentrated in hands of a few people and the 
available crown lands should be distributed to the landless 
rural population whose only mean of living is farming. Urban 
bias pricing policies of the governments should be reversed. 
Fair and attractive prices should be fixed for the 
agricultural products. Rural infra-structure and extension 
services should be improved without discrimination. These 
reforms can contribute not only to a decline in rural-urban 
disparity, fertility and subsequent rural-urban migration but 
also to an Increase in production and productivity and to 
subsequent improvement in human development. 
Provision of basic services such as health, education and 
drinking water and food subsidies is key to the human 
development of majority poor and their ability to participate 
in economic development. Some argue that most of the 
developing countries are not rich enough to provide these 
services. Adjustment policies Imposed on developing countries 
by international monitary institutions Include reduction or 
withdrawal of most of the services and subsidies provided by 
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the governments. However, even in the absence of satisfactory 
economic growth or a relatively even income distribution, 
countries can achieve significant improvements in human 
development through we11-structured public expenditures (UN, 
1991). 
Moreover, developing countries are not too poor to pay 
for human development and take care of economic growth. 
Social returns of these investments are high: in terms of 
reduced fertility and improved family nutrition (UN, 1991). 
Most budgets can accommodate these expenditures by reorienting 
national priorities (eg. cutting huge military allocations). 
Besides, provision of services such as subsidised or free 
health service and food, should be targeted to poorest areas 
and to deprived people. 
The content of these services should be consistent with 
the real.needs of the people and the area and should be 
technologically and culturally appropriate. For example, 
primary education should be given priority over higher 
education. Similarly, preventive health services should be 
given priority over expensive curative services. Small 
gravitational water schemes, protected dug wells and tube 
wells should be given priority over expensive large water 
schemes. These services are more effective in poorest 
countries than in moderately developed countries. 
The bureaucratic reforms, decentralization of authority 
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and local level institutional building are necessary for the 
effective implementation of democratically determined policies 
and reforms and for the sustainability of these activities. 
Common characteristics of bureaucracies in developing 
countries such as: a) Center orientation; b) Authoritative 
style; c) Hierarchical nature; d) Lack of accountability to 
the people; e) Long decision making process; f) Rigidity of 
procedures; and g) Departmentalism which were inherited by 
colonists, have been a constraint for democratic policies and 
reforms. These bureaucracies should be more responsive to the 
people. The decision making authorities should be 
decentralized to divisional and local level from the center 
for effective implementation of appropriate services and 
programs with the active participation of the people. 
Existing rural organizations in developing countries are 
dominated by traditional rich and a few influential 
individuals in rural areas. The procedures and traditions of 
these organizations are utterly undemocratic and exclude 
majority poor from the decision making process. That is the 
village elites control not only natural resources but also 
resources and services provided by the governments under 
various programs decided at national level. Local bureaucrats 
and these rural elites are closely allied so they form a 
dominant coalition excluding poor from a variety of 
privileges. Although, the governments are democratically 
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elected, then policies and reforms are intented to address to 
needy people, most of the necessary programs do not reach 
needy people because those programs are filtered by the local 
power structure. 
The poor in rural areas are powerless, vulnerable and 
isolated and have no capacity to acquire resources and 
services provided by the government and to participate in 
development. Hence, their acquiring and bargaining capacities 
should be developed. This can be accomplished by raising 
their consciousness and awareness and by organizing them. The 
majority poor should not only be able to receive their 
legitimate share of government services but also to make 
decisions concerning their lives. This empowerment is a 
genuine democratization process at grass roots level which 
makes national level democracies more meaningful, powerful and 
effective. 
There are various successful tasks taken in several 
developing countries to strengthen the capacity of the poor. 
This is a catalytic process of stimulating the poor to 
investigate and analyses the socio-economic reality in which 
they live, in particular the causes of their poverty. They 
can be organized to take collective efforts to overcome their 
disabilities and improve their socio-economic status 
(Thilakarathne, 1984). Trained change agents can raise the 
consciousness and awareness of the poor by interacting with 
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them and guide these people to organize them into homogeneous 
Informal groups. Social accountability and mutual trust among 
the poor can be developed through group activities. These 
groups can be genuine and effective democratic institutions. 
These groups can not only act as the stronghold of the 
receiving mechanism of existing services and resources within 
the community but they can also go a long way in generating 
self-reliant collective activities utilizing indigenous 
knowledge and local resources. In addition, these groups can 
generate scarce capital needed for investment through 
collective savings. The democratic governments can facilitate 
this democratization process at grass roots level by creating 
favorable political, legitimate and bureaucratic environments. 
"Development should start from the grassroots from village up. 
People should fully participate in planning for development 
and in the implementation of such plans. The technological 
knowledge prevailing at the people's level and the available 
local resources should be used initially. Progressively and 
appropriately it could be upgraded with advanced knowledge. 
National development plans should be based, not partially but 
totally on this broad based people's participation. It should 
first strive to satisfy the basic needs of the people and not 
artificially created wants" (Ariyarathne, 1979:134). 
Democratic governments should be based on the grassroots 
power of the people. Hence, micro level participatory 
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activities should not be limited to local welfare activities. 
Instead they should be linked to politics in higher levels. 
These grassroot organizations should be influential in local 
and national democratic processes. However, there are various 
threats and obstacles for these organizations from the power 
network of local elites. The most difficult form of 
participation to elicit and sustain is also the most 
indispensable to genuine development. This is the type of 
participation which starts at the bottom and reaches 
progressively upward into widening arenas of decision making 
(Goulet, 1989). 
Hence, the people in developing countries should not wait 
until the 'natural evolutionary progress' or until the 'world 
system' is changed. Development is a conscious task of the 
people in a country. There is a 'space' for the people in 
these countries to act for their own development. 
Theoretical Implications 
There are important implications of the findings of this 
study for the basic assumptions of mainstream theories on 
development. The assumptions of these theories and the 
identified empirical situation in developing nations can be 
summarized as in Table 9. The observations on diverse and 
complex empirical situation In developing countries are not 
adequately explained by existing sociological theories. 
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Table 9. Basic assumptions of mainstream theories on 
development and empirical evidence in developing 
countries 
Functionalist Marxist World-system Empirical 
/Modernization /Dependency evidence 
Definition of <— — social transformation -> needs to 
development redefine 
Unit of 
analysis 
country country world different 
levels 
Development evolution 
process 
evolution evolution not 
automatic 
Factors endogenous endogenous exogenous diverse 
Primacy internal 
of factors factors 
internal external interaction 
factors factors bet. diff. 
factors 
Dichotomy feudal/cap. 
of dev. 
feudal/cap. cap/socialist no 
dichotomy 
Interven. not possible not possible not possible possible 
of people 
People's obj ects 
role passive 
objects 
passive 
objects active 
subjects 
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This inadequacy of the explanatory and guiding capabilities 
of existing sociological theories on the Third World 
development call a for more comprehensive theoretical support 
for Third world development. This theoretical paradigm should 
incorporate following elements. 
1. It should be inductively derived on the basis of empirical 
evidence, especially from the Third world. 
2. It should be flexible and nondeterministic enough to 
incorporate diversities and complexities in the Third World. 
3. It should be diverse enough to incorporate different level 
factors and their interactions into the development process. 
4. It should be humanistic enough to recognize human 
potential and energy which can be used to initiate, divert and 
carry on the development process in the existing macro 
environment. 
5. It should include a redefinition of development 
incorporating both economic and human aspects of the desired 
change. 
An appropriate theoretical perspective in which the above 
elements are incorporated, only can provide the necessary 
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guidance for the task of development In developing countries. 
This theoretical perspective should constantly be fed by the 
empirical observations. That is, theory and practice should 
not be separated, but be mutually supportive. 
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Appendix 1. DATA FOR THE COUNTRIES USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
Country XI X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 XIO Xll X12 X13 X14 X15 
Ethiopia 26 101 31 1 46 58 6 2 4.15 4.79 155 1704 36 
Bhutan . 24 . . 2 45 . 6 . . 5.01 139 2477 15 25 
B'Faso . , , 1 47 53 7 « 11.19 5.01 140 2003 20 32 
Nepal . 27 22 30 1 47 65 6 15 7.95 5.01 130 1997 79 79 
B'desh . 32 . 98 1 50 53 6 25 3.49 5.08 121 1804 71 60 
Malawi 34 25 26 38 3 45 50 8 7.97 5.08 153 2415 51 62 
Zaire . 29 60 10 1 52 21 6 1 11.28 5.08 100 2151 9 98 
Mali . 14 5 22 1 47 . 7 2 . 5.19 144 1810 12 23 
Burma , . , . 2 59 35 4 5 1.70 5.30 64 2508 . 102 
M'bique . 24 40 35 2 48 . 6 . . 5.35 120 1617 13 84 
Madagascar . 44 99 94 1 53 31 6 . 10.97 5.44 130 2452 18 121 
Uganda . 35 14 10 1 48 52 7 1 7.58 5.44 105 2483 16 . 
Burundi . 23 23 96 1 48 . 7 9 . 5.48 114 2233 39 53 
Tanzania 39 41 14 7 3 53 46 7 . 9.33 5.52 108 2316 72 
Togo , 
Niger 
Benin 
. 34 61 29 1 53 45 7 . 4.04 5.52 96 2221 35 95 
. 12 21 27 1 44 68 7 . 4.19 5.56 135 2276 34 28 
. 22 . 38 1 50 59 7 6 2.25 5.60 117 2248 18 65 
Somalia . 20 18 92 2 47 71 7 . 1.14 5.63 134 2074 36 25 
C'Afr.Rep . 26 49 0 1 50 46 6 . 10.20 5.67 134 2059 16 73 
India 38 44 7 11 5 57 47 4 35 2.85 5.67 86 2126 56 92 
Rwanda . 30 22 86 1 48 75 8 1 4.39 5.67 116 1935 59 64 
Kenya 
Zambia 
51 48 34 17 1 57 35 8 17 8.85 5.70 74 2214 28 94 
42 48 102 18 1 53 14 7 . 38.09 5.70 82 2126 47 103 
S' Leone 42 15 86 23 1 41 34 7 4 5.84 5.74 154 1784 22 
Sudan 41 25 8 27 1 49 54 7 . 2.73 5.77 108 2168 21 49 
Haiti , 36 46 99 1 54 . 5 7 . 5.80 119 1784 35 78 
Pakistan . 42 22 36 3 52 40 7 11 1.67 5.86 111 2180 53 47 
Lesotho . 58 , 78 1 55 65 6 . 2.36 5.91 102 2299 14 115 
Ghana . 36 55 29 1 54 44 6 1.76 5.97 89 1785 50 66 
Sri Lanka 34 79 43 53 5 70 28 3 62 3.00 5.99 29 2485 36 103 
Mauritania . 79 . 42 1 47 32 7 1 33.38 6.04 127 2071 * 
Senegal 47 27 90 28 2 47 25 7 12 9.96 6.04 130 2418 42 55 
Afg'than . 21 3 34 2 . . . . « 2179 19 
Chad . 16 17 86 1 45 42 6 10.95 134 1733 26 38 
Guinea . 16 83 25 1 42 . 6 . 148 1731 15 30 
Cambodia , 47 , , 2 . . . . . 2171 21 
Lao PDR . 51 . 40 2 50 . 6 . 146 2317 21 91 
Vietnam . 61 . , 2 65 . 5 20 . . 47 2281 41 100 
Liberia 33 34 17 2 54 27 7 7 11.70 6.13 87 2373 20 
Yemen PDR . 37 . 99 1 50 . 7 , , 6.15 142 2255 31 66 
Indonesia 39 59 7 14 2 57 56 4 40 1.83 6.19 87 2476 36 118 
Yemen Ar , 33 . 99 1 46 . 7 2 . 6.31 152 2266 31 67 
Philippine 43 71 39 26 3 63 26 5 44 3.90 6.33 46 2260 66 106 
Morocco « 49 25 47 1 60 23 5 36 4.95 6.38 85 2729 27 81 
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Bolivia 49 55 60 32 1 53 23 6 26 3 .64 6. 40 113 2171 49 91 
Zimbabwe 57 58 , 2 58 18 6 40 19 .20 6. 43 74 2144 52 131 
Nigeria 32 58 13 1 51 53 7 5 2 .58 6. 46 104 2139 33 92 
Domin•rep 70 5 96 4 66 23 4 50 4 .03 6. 57 67 2530 62 124 
P'Guina g 47 97 58 3 52 42 5 4 6 .21 6. 58 64 2145 16 64 
C•Ivoire 49 39 * 3 52 47 7 3 6 .55 6. 59 96 2308 19 78 
Honduras 57 56 101 84 2 64 40 6 35 2 .69 6. 61 72 2224 69 102 
Egypt 39 50 4 96 2 61 29 5 32 3 .41 6. 63 88 3275 76 85 
Nicaragua 51 74 58 82 2 61 25 6 27 3 .42 6. 67 65 2464 56 101 
Thailand 44 78 14 34 2 64 35 3 65 10 .78 6. 70 41 2399 35 97 
E'Salvodor 46 65 42 83 2 61 29 5 47 2 .80 6. 71 61 2155 40 70 
Botswana 65 49 3 59 34 7 28 12 .43 6. 73 69 2159 57 104 
Jamaica 82 104 95 4 73 10 3 52 6 .84 6. 73 19 2578 86 106 
Cameroon 47 60 11 1 56 32 7 . 11 .42 6. 81 96 2080 26 107 
Guatemala 46 59 51 36 2 61 . 6 25 . 6. 84 61 2345 52 76 
Congo 39 0 44 1 58 19 6 . 6 .00 6. 90 75 2345 21 . 
Paraguay 78 29 86 4 67 37 5 49 1 .41 6. 91 43 2873 26 101 
Peru 54 75 79 41 3 60 18 4 46 4 .39 6. 99 90 2120 55 122 
Turkey 49 75 11 75 4 65 34 4 62 5 .01 7. 01 79 3218 78 116 
Tunisia 46 66 48 84 3 63 22 4 42 2 .55 7. 04 74 2796 75 118 
Ecuador 76 26 47 3 66 27 5 44 2 .36 7. 06 64 2005 76 114 
Mauritius 79 42 3 66 16 2 75 2 .13 7. 09 35 2717 95 106 
Colombia 48 80 52 94 4 65 30 3 78 1 .79 7. 11 47 2588 70 117 
Chile 43 93 101 86 1 71 9 3 . 4 .14 7. 19 20 2544 94 109 
Costa Rica 41 92 94 97 5 74 24 3 68 2 .37 7. 30 18 2807 91 101 
Jordan 75 21 95 2 65 . 6 27 . 7. 34 46 2968 93 99 
Syria 69 9 78 3 64 29 7 . 1 .97 7. 36 50 3235 75 108 
Lebanon 73 87 4 , 12 . . 2 .11 . . 3046 92 . 
Brazil 56 78 101 93 3 65 19 4 65 4 .26 7. 50 65 2657 77 104 
Malaysia 
S' Africa 
47 80 100 18 4 69 28 4 51 4. 05 7.51 27 2601 69 99 
53 73 101 0 1 61 10 5 . 4 .48 7. 52 74 2926 0 . 
Mexico 52 87 43 70 5 68 14 4 48 5 .03 7. 53 48 3126 75 115 
Uruguay 40 91 21 80 5 71 15 3 . 1 .47 7. 55 28 2791 80 110 
Panama 54 88 105 72 2 72 18 3 61 3 .03 7. 75 24 2423 82 105 
Argentina 41 91 105 69 2 70 17 3 . 1 .31 7. 76 33 3216 64 108 
Korea Rep 90 6 99 4 69 38 2 70 2 .41 7. 77 25 2806 . 96 
Algeria 61 . 57 2 62 15 6 . 7 .60 7. 86 77 2799 88 94 
Venezuela 47 86 103 89 5 70 7 4 . 7 .32 7. 98 37 2485 . 108 
Gabon 55 52 31 2 52 26 5 . 13 .57 8. 03 105 2448 92 123 
Oman 42 53 1 54 61 7 . 1 .56 8. 51 103 . 99 89 
Trinidad 42 88 44 1 70 8 3 53 3 .43 8. 59 21 2915 99 95 
Israel 96 26 5 75 . 3 . . 8. 73 12 3019 . 99 
Hong Kong 
Singapore 
93 88 . 1 76 2 2 72 2 .26 8. 84 8 2692 99 105 
52 90 101 58 1 73 3 2 74 1 .78 8. 91 9 2696 99 115 
Iran 52 66 44 24 2 59 26 6 . 2 .61 . 109 3115 75 112 
Iraq 76 31 64 1 63 18 7 . 6 .39 . 71 2891 89 100 
S' Arabia 70 102 94 1 63 8 7 . 46 .36 8. 85 64 3057 91 69 
Kuwait 84 , 1 73 0 5 . . 9. 54 19 3102 99 101 
U.A.Imirate . 78 * , 1 69 . 6 . . 9. 59 33 3652 93 99 
Libya 72 , 2 61 5 7 . 24 .60 . 85 3585 . 127 
Angola . 30 101 22 2 44 • 6 • • • 139 1926 32 93 
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Note: 
XI = income inequality (Gini coefficient) 
X2 = Human development index 
X3 = Foreign capital penetration 
X4 = Ethnic homogeneity 
X5 = Democratic experience 
X6 = Life expectancy 
X7 = Relative size of agricultural sector 
X8 = Fertility rate 
X9 - Use of contraception 
XIO = Disparity between Agricultural and Industrial sectors 
XII = Economic development (natural log of GNP) 
X12 = Infant mortality rate 
X13 = Daily calorie consumption 
X14 = Access to drinking water 
X15 = Primary education 
Missing values are indicated as . 

